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ABSTRACT

The ultimate end of patent law should be to spur innovations that
improve human welfare-innovations that make people better off. But firms
will only invest resources in developing patentable inventions that will
allow them to make money-that is, inventions that people will want to use
and buy. This can gravely distort the types of incentives that firms face and
the types of inventions they pursue. Nowhere is this truer than in the
pharmaceutical field There is by now substantial evidence that treatments
for diseases that primarily afflict poorer people-including the citizens of
developing nations-are dramatically underproduced, compared with
drugs that treat diseases that afflict the wealthy. In addition, the
pharmaceutical markets are rife with "me too " drugs-drugs that treat
diseases or conditions for which successful medications already exist.
This state of affairs is not inevitable. In recent years, medical and
psychological research on well-being has created the capacity for
policymakers to draw direct links between patents and human welfare.
Armed with this information, policymakers have, for thefirst time, the power
to use the patent system to directly incentivize welfare-enhancing
innovations. In this Article, we propose a system of extended patent terms
for drug inventions that have a significant impact on human welfare. We
further propose that policymakers lift many of the legal protections for
patents that have an insubstantial effect on human welfare-which we term
'futility patents "-making those patents easier to challenge and invalidate.
The result would be a reorientation of pharmaceutical firm incentives
toward drugs that will have a significant impact on welfare, particularly for
poorer and underserved populations, and awcry from drugs that are
profitable but do little to improve human life.
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INTRODUCTION

What is the purpose of patent law? The conventional understanding of
patents is that they exist to promote innovation-or, as it says in Article I,
Section 8 of the US Constitution, to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts."' But innovation is not good in and of itself. A society that
innovated only more and better ways to torment itself' would not be doing
well. Rather, the ultimate end of patent law should be to spur innovations
that improve human welfare-innovations that make people better off. To
accomplish this, patent law is parasitic on the marketplace. Patents entitle
their owners to exclude competitors from making, using, or selling the

1.
2.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See, e.g., FACEBOOK, www.facebook.com; TWITTER, www.twitter.com.
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patented invention for a limited time.3 In effect, patents create legal quasimonopolies: if only the patent owner can sell the patented invention, then
the patent owner can charge (higher) monopoly prices and earn greater
profits. It is this promise of greater profits that spurs innovation. 4
Because patent law relies on the market-and the possibility of
monopoly profits-it necessarily incorporates all of the strengths-and
importantly, all of the many shortcomings-of market behavior.5 Most
notably, patent law relies on individual consumers to decide which
inventions are valuable and which are not. Firms will only invest resources
in developing inventions that will allow them to make money-that is,
inventions that people will want to use and buy. The fact that people are
excited to purchase an invention, even at monopoly prices, is usually taken
to be a powerful signal that the invention is valuable and will increase
human welfare. If not, why would people pay for it? 6
But markets are hardly infallible. The fact that an innovation is beneficial
for human welfare does not mean that it will be profitable, if the people
whose welfare it will increase cannot afford it. This means that innovations
that primarily serve poorer people will be underproduced.' In addition,
sometimes it is possible to capture large market share with an invention that
is only slightly better (or even no better) than the inventions that preceded
it. This means that firms have significant incentives to play a version of
follow-the-leader: if Firm A has created an invention that is selling well,
Firm B can make money by creating a similar invention and siphoning off
some of Firm A's customers, even if Firm B's invention represents, at most,
a marginal improvement on Firm A's invention.8 Patent law's reliance on
markets can thus drive firms to invent products that they know will sell well,
rather than products that might have a much greater impact on welfare.
These concerns are present across a wide range of technological areas,
but perhaps nowhere more so than in the area of pharmaceuticals. There is
substantial evidence that treatments for diseases that primarily afflict poorer
people-including the citizens of developing nations-are dramatically
underproduced, compared with drugs that treat diseases that afflict the

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
3.
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
4.
wILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 20 (2003).
5.
See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of
Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1927 (2013).
6.
See discussion infra notes 41-45.

7.

See generally Jean

O.

Lanjouw, Intellectual Property and the Availability of

Pharmaceuticalsin Poor Countries, 3 INNOVATION POL'Y & ECON. 91 (2003).
See infra notes 69-71.
8.
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wealthy.9 In addition, the pharmaceutical markets are rife with "me too"
drugs--drugs that treat diseases or conditions for which successful
medications already exist.10 A "me too" drug that taps into a large consumer
market can be very profitable even if it offers small or zero (or negative)
benefits compared with the drugs that preceded it. And these drugs, which
contribute little or nothing to human welfare, can absorb scarce research and
development funds from pharmaceutical firms and crowd out investment in
drugs that might do much more good.
Policymakers have largely treated these shortfalls as if they are
unavoidable, the necessary consequences of patent law's slavish devotion
to the market. The problem has been thought to be one of measurement."1
How could policymakers know which drugs are most valuable to welfareand thus most deserving of encouragement and incentives-without a signal
from the market? Put another way: if the entire point of patent law is to rely
on the market to determine which inventions are valuable, it is no wonder
that policymakers seem to be at a loss when the market turns unreliable.
But policymakers no longer need feel so constrained. In recent years,
medical and psychological research on well-being has revealed new ways
of understanding and measuring human welfare, to the point that
policymakers can now estimate with accuracy how much a given disease or
condition diminishes welfare, and how much a particular drug treatment
improves it. The most promising approach involves the science of hedonic
psychology, through which researchers have been able to determine close
proxies for welfare.' 2 Hedonic psychology is in its relative infancy, but there
is an alternative as well: the medical concept of Quality-Adjusted Life Years
(QALYs), which provides a reasonable measure of the length and quality of
an individual's life.' 3
These tools permit policymakers to draw direct links, for the first time,
between patents and human welfare. These types of connections are
9.
Amy Kapczynski, Samantha Chaifetz, Zachary Katz & Yochai Benkler, Addressing Global
Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.

1031, 1038 (2005).
10. Brita Pekarsky, Should FinancialIncentives Be Used to Differentially Reward 'Me-Too' and
Innovative Drugs?, 28 PHARMACOECONOMICS 1 (2010).
11.
See infra notes 49-58.
12.
See WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman, Ed
Diener & Norbert Schwarz eds., 1999). Our work joins a growing cohort of legal scholars who are
interested in applying the insights of hedonic psychology to legal problems. See, e.g., JOHN BRONSTEEN,
CHRISTOPHER BUCCAFUSCO & JONATHAN S. MASUR, HAPPINESS AND THE LAW (2014); LAW AND
HAPPINESS (Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein eds., 2010); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING
AND PUBLIC POLICY (Matthew D. Adler & Marc Fleurbaey eds., 2016); David Fagundes, Buying
Happiness: Property, Acquisition, and Subjective Well-Being, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1851 (2017);
Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 241 (2013).
13.
Graham Loomes & Lynda McKenzie, The Use of QALYs in Health Care Decision Making,

28 SOC. SCI. & MED. 299 (1989).

2021]

DRUGS, PATENTS, AND WELL-BEING

1407

generally impossible for many types of inventions, such as consumer
electronics. It is difficult to determine the welfare impact of a new iPhone,
and any given electronic device likely incorporates thousands of patents,
which makes it hard to isolate the welfare effect of any given patent. But
these sorts of connections are entirely possible for one class of invention:
pharmaceuticals. First, the new research tools described in the preceding
paragraph have made it possible to reliably measure the welfare impacts of
diseases and their treatments. And second, each drug is typically linked to
one central patent on the active molecule itself.' 4
Armed with this sort of information, policymakers have the power to use
the patent system in ways heretofore unimaginable, to directly incentivize
welfare-enhancing innovations without needing to rely upon the market to
get those incentives right. In this Article, we design and describe precisely
this type of system of patent-based incentives.' 5 We propose that
policymakers grant extended patent terms to drug inventions that have a
significant impact on human welfare, as measured using QALYs or hedonic
psychology.' 6 We further propose that policymakers lift many of the legal
protections for patents that have an insubstantial effect on human welfarewhich we term "futility patents"-making those patents easier to challenge
and invalidate. The worst patents, those that offer zero or even negative
contributions to social welfare, should be invalidated outright. The result
would be a reorientation of pharmaceutical firm incentives: firms would
have much greater incentives to pursue drugs that benefit poorer populations
because the firms could receive extended patent terms for those drugs. And
they would have much weaker incentives to pursue "me too" drugs and
other medications that might be profitable but have minimal effects on
welfare. All told, our proposal offers the possibility of remedying the
inadequacies and inefficiencies of the market for pharmaceutical drugs, a
problem that has vexed policymakers for decades.
Our Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains the manner in which
patents are meant to promote welfare and the ways in which systemic
failures in the market for pharmaceutical drugs can cause them to fall short.
Part II shows how policymakers can draw direct connections between drug
patents and human welfare using hedonic psychology and QALYs. Part III
describes and analyzes our proposal for heightened patent incentives for
welfare-enhancing patents and diminished incentives for "futile" patents.

14.
15.

See infra notes 119-121.
See infra Part 111. CREATING INCENTIVES FOR WELFARE-ENHANCING DRUGS.

Neel Sukhatme and Gregg Bloche independently published a similar proposal while our
16.
manuscript was in progress. See Neel U. Sukhatme & M. Gregg Bloche, Health Care Costs and the Arc
ofInnovation, 104 MINN. L. REV. 955 (2019). Although complementary, our proposal differs from theirs
in a number of ways. See infra note 228 for further details.
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Part IV responds to some potential objections and demonstrates that our
proposal is resilient to a variety of potential concerns.
Patent law has been tethered to the marketplace for too long, to
deleterious effect. We propose to decouple it, to the benefit of patients, drug
companies, and society as a whole.
I. PATENTS, MARKETS, AND WELL-BEING
The US Constitution gives Congress the power to grant patents to
inventors in order "to promote the Progress of... useful Arts."" Most courts
and scholars understand this language to create a consequentialist
foundation for patent law that encourages Congress to enact laws to enhance
human welfare.' 8 Indeed, the Patent Act seems to require that patents only
be granted to "useful" inventions. 19 Yet despite these commitments, patent
law and scholarship have taken a decidedly laissez-faire approach to the
relationship between patents and welfare.2 0 In this Part, we briefly introduce
the standard theory for how patent law can enhance human well-being by
solving a public goods problem in information. 2' We then show how courts
and scholars have generally rejected the possibility of closely connecting
patent doctrine-and especially particular patents-to well-being. Doing
so, they argue, would involve insurmountable data and judgment
challenges.2 2 Moreover, many scholars believe that governmental attempts
to connect patents to the well-being they generate are unnecessary because
23
market forces are better determinants of value than legal institutions. We
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In full, the clause grants Congress the power: "To promote the
17.
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." For an account of the history of the clause
and the relationship between its parts, see Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the IntellectualProperty Clause:
Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771

(2006).
18.

See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Aronson v. Quick Point

Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4; RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N.
HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Ex

Ante Versus Ex PostJustificationsfor Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129 (2004). But see
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011).
19.
35 U.S.C. § 101.
Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REv. 1195, 1205 (2010); Christopher
20.
Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property Law and the Promotion of Welfare, in 1
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 98 (Benjamin Depoorter

& Peter S. Menell eds., 2019); Estelle Derclaye, Eudemonic Intellectual Property:Patents and Related
Rights as Engines of Happiness, Peace, and Sustainability, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 495 (2012).
We use the terms "welfare" and "well-being" interchangeably throughout this Article.
21.
Risch, supra note 20, at 1207 ("In practice, however, limiting patents to those that meet a
22.
pre-determined degree of utility would likely be too costly and unworkable."); Michael W. Carroll, One

Size Does Not Fit All: A Frameworkfor TailoringIntellectualProperty Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361,
1374 (2009); Eric E. Johnson, CalibratingPatentLifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH.
L.J. 269, 298 (2006); Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FED. LAW. 44, 49 (2008).
23.

Risch, supra note 20, at 1206 n.42.
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conclude, though, by noting that many commentators are beginning to
question the connection between patents and welfare, especially in the
context of pharmaceuticals. 24 In some ways, pharmaceutical innovations are
the shining lights of the patent regime. In many others, however, including
neglect of rare diseases or those that primarily afflict the poor, pharma
patents seem to do little to improve well-being. 2s
A. How PatentLaw Tries to Improve the World
The standard economic justification for patent law is well known, and
we will only briefly recite it here. 26 In many cases, inventions are extremely
costly to create, but once they have been developed, they are often
incredibly cheap to copy. 27 Most pharmaceuticals, for example, cost
millions of dollars to develop and bring to market, but producing the actual
medicine that people consume is typically inexpensive. 28 In a world without
patent law, competitors could simply wait to see which drug innovations
were effective and then produce these at lower prices than the inventors,
because the copyists do not bear any research and development (R&D)
costs. 29 Anticipating this behavior, firms will never bother to invest
resources in R&D, and society will forego the benefits of new inventions. 30
This is where patent law steps in. Patent law gives inventors of "any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"3 1 a
period of exclusive rights during which they are the only ones who can make
or sell products that incorporate the patented invention.32 During this period,
patentees are effectively monopolists with respect to their products, which
means they are often able to charge prices for access to their inventions that
exceed the marginal costs of making those products.33 Thus, patented
pharmaceuticals typically sell for much higher prices than do identical
generic drugs that enter the market once the patent has expired. 34 By giving
24.

Infra notes 64-75.

Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize
25.
Act of 2005, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 25, 26 (2007).
26.
For lengthier treatments, see LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4; SUZANNE SCOTCHMER,
INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004).
27.
Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term

Research? Evidencefrom Cancer ClinicalTrials, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. 2044, 2059-60 (2015); Margaret
K. Kyle, Are Important Innovations Rewarded? Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets, 53 REV.
INDUST. ORG. 211, 215 (2018).

28.

Kyle, supra note 27, at 213.

29.
Long, supranote 22, at 45.
30.
Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents-PrizesDebate, 92 TEx. L.
REV. 303, 310 (2013).

31.
32.

35 U.S.C. § 101.
35 U.S.C. § 283.

33.

Long, supranote 22, at 45.

34.

Kyle, supra note 27, at 213; Budish, Roin, & Williams, supra note 27, at 2059.
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inventors an opportunity to charge higher-than-marginal prices for access to
inventions, patent law helps inventors recoup their R&D costs. It thereby
provides an incentive for their innovative behavior.35
But patent law isn't all sunshine and rainbows. As we detail below, 36
patent law's incentive benefits come with significant costs. Higher prices
for patented goods are borne by consumers or other payers (including
insurance companies and the government). Moreover, many people are
priced out of the market for patented goods, even though they would have
been willing and able to purchase a given patented product if it were priced
at marginal cost-that is, at the cost to the producer of making one
additional unit of the product. 3 7 These people miss out on the benefits of the
innovation, at least until the patent expires. 38 Furthermore, patent law
imposes a number of other costs, including administrative costs of running
the system and costs for competitors who must expend effort searching for
existing patents and designing around them. 39 The law's goal is to develop
a set of doctrines that optimizes this tradeoff between incentives for current
inventors and access for consumers and competitors. Because granting
patents produces both costs and benefits, an ideal patent law would figure
out how to do so only when the existence of the patent incentive is
worthwhile. 40
Importantly, patent law does not directly subsidize invention. 41 Rather,
it channels innovative activity through the market. 42 Patent law gives patent
owners the exclusive right to sell products that embody their inventions, but
those rights are not worth much if no one wants to buy their products. Just
as a copyright in a movie no one wants to see is worthless, a patent that
covers a product no one wants to buy conveys little value to the inventor.
Accordingly, inventors will direct their efforts toward products that
consumers want-which are generally products that will make their lives
better off.43

35.

Heidi L. Williams, How Do PatentsAffect Research Investments?, 9 ANN. REV. ECON. 441,

442 (2017).
36.
37.

See infra Part I.C.
Economists refer to this as deadweight loss. Benjamin N. Roin, The Casefor TailoringPatent

Awards Basedon Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 672, 691 (2014).
If they're still alive then.
38.
39.

See generally Christopher Buccafusco, Stefan Bechtold & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The

Nature of Sequential Innovation, 59 WM & MARY L. REV. 1 (2017).
Roin, supra note 37, at 693 ("If the government could perfectly tailor patent awards, it could
40.
maximize the amount of socially valuable innovation incentivized without causing any unnecessary
consumer deadweight loss.").

41.

See Hemel & Ouellette, supranote 30, at 346.

42.
43.

Sources cited in Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 20, at 102 -03.
On the relationship between patents and preference satisfaction, see id.
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In its current form, patent law permits the market to determine which
inventions are valuable and worth pursuing. 44 But that is not a necessary or
inevitable state of affairs. In the alternative, the law might try to drive
inventors toward the kinds of inventions that are likely to have the biggest
impact on social welfare. Thus, policymakers might try to determine
whether different industries are more reliant on patent protection than others
and then adjust the scope or duration of patents accordingly. 45 Going further,
policymakers might try to fine-tune patent protection at the invention
level-that is, with respect to each patent. 46 The law could try to weed out
the inventions that do not increase social welfare and deny them patent
protection. 47 Doing so could yield enormous welfare gains. 48
B. The Challenges of ConnectingPatents to Well-Being
Patent law, however, has taken only limited steps to connect protection
and social value at the industry level, 49 and it has almost entirely avoided
doing so at the invention level.50 This is despite the fact that the law has an
obvious candidate in the Patent Act's first section: § 101's requirement that
an invention be "useful." 5 1 The US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) and
the courts could read this language to entail an affirmative requirement that
patent applicants establish that their inventions are likely to improve social
welfare relative to the status quo. Although at times they have flirted with
this possibility, for the most part, "the requirement that an invention be

44.

Amy Kapczynski, Dangerous Times: The FDA's Role in Information Production, Past and

Future, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2357, 2363 (2018); Aidan Hollis, An Efficient Reward System for
Pharmaceutical Innovation 1 (June 10, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.researchgate.net/pr
ofile/Aidan_Hollis/publication/251697338_AnEfficientRewardSystemfor_PharmaceuticalInnov
ation/links/5c895b8892851 c ldf93ff319/An-Efficient-Reward-System-for-Pharmaceutical-Innovation.
pdf; Kyle, supranote 27, at 215.
45.
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575,

1696 (2003).
46.
Kyle, supra note 27, at 212 ("Specifically, if more important innovations provide higher
returns to society, then innovation policy should provide them with higher rewards.").
Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687
47.

(2010).
48.
Carroll, supra note 22, at 1364 ("Uniformity cost is the social cost that arises when a
particular use has been assigned to the party who is less able to make a socially productive use of the
opportunity.").
49.
Roin, supra note 37, at 703 ("Patents almost always offer innovators the same set of legal
entitlements to exclude others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention, and run for a fixed
twenty-year term beginning on the patent's filing date."). The relatively few situations of technologyspecific patent law tend to relate to pharmaceuticals, including the term extensions provided by the
Hatch-Waxman Act and the Orphan Drug Act. See discussion infra notes 117-122.
Patent law's nonobviousness doctrine is one effort to screen out inventions that would be
50.
socially costly. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (explaining patent law's obviousness
doctrine); Masur, Costly Screens, supra note 47, at 690.

51.

35 U.S.C. § 101.
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useful has been nearly nonexistent." 52 Impossible inventions like perpetual
motions machines might fall afoul of the standard, as could a chemical
compound with no known use. 53 But otherwise, the PTO will not reject a
patent application merely because it fails to provide therapeutic gains over
alternatives.5 4
Scholars have defended patent law's unwillingness to consider a patent's
utility on a number of fronts.5 5 One obvious challenge is that many products
are the result of dozens or even hundreds of patented technologies. 56 A
smartphone incorporates hundreds of different patents, so assigning relative
welfare values to any one of them would be impossible.57 Even if it were
possible to connect patents more or less directly to products, other data
challenges would loom on the horizon. 58 A policymaker would need to
know about a product's sales and the sales of its competitors in order to
gauge its contribution to well-being. 59 And, of course, manipulating patent
rights in response to a patent's effect on well-being requires policymakers
to articulate a valid and reliable measure thereof.60
Ultimately, then, most scholars have decided that the market is the most
competent institution to determine and reward inventive value. Markets
allow value to be measured ex post rather than ex ante, and they allow
private individuals to make decisions about which products provide them
Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 58 (2011).
52.
Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REv. 1046, 1091(2014); Risch, supra
53.
note 52, at 65-66.
Kyle, supra note 27, at 217. In fact, the PTO typically would not be in a position to make
54.
such a determination at the time of a patent application, because patents on drugs are often filed well
before clinical testing for effectiveness has begun. "The first patent application is filed well before
clinical trials have been completed, and little information on therapeutic value exists at that point." Id.
Long, supranote 22, at 49 ("The same might be said of a unitary patent system that Winston
55.
Churchill famously said about democracy: It's the worst form of patent system, except for all the others
that have been tried.").
See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
56.
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCt. 698 (1998) (discussing the ways in which the various
holders of the many patents necessary for research can hold up innovation in a field by refusing to license
their patents).
57.
David S. Abrams & Bhaven N. Sampat, Pharmaceutical Patent Citations and Real value 2
(Jan. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) ("Unlike many complex manufactured
products that may involve hundreds or thousands of patents, drugs tend to depend on one or two key
patents.").
58.
Johnson, supra note 22, at 299 ("They depend upon inputs such as the importance of the
invention, which is difficult or impossible to calculate ex ante, and which would likely involve expensive
litigation or administrative costs if calculated ex post.") (emphasis omitted); Carroll, supra note 22, at

1374.
Roin, supra note 37, at 704 ("The lack of information about individual inventions also
59.
inhibits the development of sound technology-specific laws, since the government often does not know
when to offer stronger or weaker patent rights and has difficulty administering the dividing lines between
technologies.").
60.
Risch, supra note 52, at 64 ("Many issues cannot be resolved by simple appeal to the social
good, because that goal is too general and progress toward it is too unmeasurable to provide any practical
aid to decisionmakers.").
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with the most satisfaction.6 ' Moreover, to the extent that inventors develop
products that people do not desire, the standard theory suggests that only
the inventors will bear the costs of their mistakes. 62 The firms and their
investors will lose money if they fail to make products that the market
demands, but, otherwise, society experiences little downside from their
errors. 63
C. How Patents and Markets May Be Failingin Pharma
Despite criticism of patent law's effects on other areas of technology,
commenters consistently hold up the pharmaceutical industry as the shining
example of the success of the patent system. 64 Pharma patents are much
clearer than software patents and thus provide much more useful disclosures
to experts in the field. 65 And because pharmaceuticals rely less on sequential
innovation, where one technology builds on another, they are less
susceptible to trolls, thickets, and holdup. 66 Lastly, pharmaceuticals require
enormous R&D investments that make it easier to justify long periods of
exclusive rights compared to software. 67
Yet while pharmaceuticals may demonstrate patent law at its most costjustified, their shine has been seriously tarnished. There is now an
exhaustive literature exploring the ways in which pharmaceutical
innovations, although often touted as patent law's poster children, are, in
fact, failing millions of people globally. 68 While pharmaceutical innovations
are improving and saving lives around the world, pharma firms, lured by the
extravagant returns associated with patented drugs, have largely failed to
produce drugs that treat the needs of small populations and of the poor.69
Very often, firms instead produce "me too" drugs with limited therapeutic
value but, thanks to patents and insurance markets, massive prices. 70 We
explain these issues further below.
Although economists prefer to rely on markets as the best means to
estimate the value of innovations, markets for pharmaceuticals are unusual

61.
Risch, supra note 20, at 1206.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
64.
Carroll, supra note 22, at 1390; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 45, at 1590.
65.
JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS,
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46 (2009).
Long, supra note 22, at 45.
66.
Kyle, supra note 27, at 215.
67.
Kapczynski, supra note 44, at 997; Buccafusco & Masur, supra note 42, at 7.
68.
Hollis, supra note 44, at 1; Kapczynski, supra note 44, at 997.
69.
Kyle, supra note 27, at 211.
70.

1414

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 98:1403

in a number of important ways. 71 The demand side of the pharmaceutical
market is especially peculiar. Unlike in standard markets for smartphones
or automobiles, the ultimate consumers of pharmaceuticals-patients-are
not primarily responsible either for selecting products or paying for them. 72
Doctors typically choose which drugs their patients take, and, because
doctors do not pay for the drugs, they have little reason to consider their
relative prices. 73 In some cases, drug companies may even be illegally
paying doctors to prescribe their medications. 74 Ultimately, insurance
companies and the government (through Medicaid, Medicare, and the
Veterans Administration) are responsible for paying the majority of
pharmaceutical costs, 75 and so far, their efforts to rein in rising drug prices
have largely failed.76 In a recent study of prices of top-selling drugs between
2012 and 2017, the authors report a median price increase of 76%, with
three quarters of drug prices increasing by more than 50% and almost half
of prices more than doubling.77
Although the prices of patented drugs are rising at an astonishing pace,
perhaps these high prices are justified in light of the enormous value they
provide by encouraging lifesaving and life-improving innovations? Again,
many commentators are skeptical, and, again, they often blame the patent
system.78 One of the patent system's purported benefits is its reliance on
markets to direct innovation toward the most socially valuable R&D.79 As
we have seen, this connection may break down when purchasers and payers

Id. at 212 ("In most markets, economists measure the value of an innovation with estimates
71.
of demand. Markets aggregate information about a product's quality, and we expect ... its price and
market share to reflect this. In practice, this approach is difficult to apply in pharmaceutical markets, for
reasons that will be outlined in the following section. As a result, the link between price (or profits) and
social value--essential for innovation incentives-may be weak.").

72.

Id. at 213.

Hollis, supra note 44, at 2 ("Second, pharmaceutical markets are extraordinary because the
73.
person choosing the medicine (the physician) is not the consumer, and often the consumer does not pay,
at least directly. Thus similar but not identical medicines do not typically create strong price competition
. .. .").
74.
Owen Dyer, Firm Bribed Doctors to PrescribeOverpricedDrug, US Alleges in Suit, BRIT.

MED. J. (May 2, 2019).
75.

Mark A. Lemley, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette & Rachel E. Sachs, The Medicare Innovation

Subsidy, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 75, 81 (2020) ("[B]ut here we note that most users don't directly pay the
monopoly price for drugs. Rather, at least in developed countries, allocation of pharmaceuticals and
other biomedical technologies is usually mediated through public or private health insurance.").

76.

Id. at 77.

77.
Nathan E. Wineinger, Yunyue Zhang & Eric J. Topol, Trends in Prices of PopularBrandName PrescriptionDrugs in the UnitedStates, 2 JAMA NETWORK OPEN 1, 4 (2019) ("In total, 17 drugs
(35%) more than doubled in costs, including Chantix, Cialis, Forteo, Lexapro, Lipitor, Lyrica, Onfi,
Premarin, Renvela, Simponi, viagra, and Zetia; tumor necrosis factor inhibitors Enbrel and Humira; and

insulins Humalog, Humulin, and Novolog.").
78.
Kapczynski et al., supranote 9, at 1038; Neel U. Sukhatme & M. Gregg Bloche, Health Care
Costs and the Arc of Innovation, 104 MINN. L. REV. 955 (2019); Hollis, supra note 44, at 3.
79.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 25-28.
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are not the ultimate consumers of goods. 80 And it further erodes when
consumers' willingness or ability to pay for products is not a good proxy for
their social value. 81 The market for pharmaceuticals exhibits exactly this
disconnect. 82
On the one hand, as we have described, the existence of insurance
payments and guaranteed coverage makes treating certain diseases
especially lucrative. 83 This is true even for drugs that produce little or no
additional therapeutic value compared to their competitors. 84 Accordingly,
firms are motivated to produce "me too" drugs to gain a share of the
enormous markets for conditions covered by insurance. 85 Seeing the
enormous markets available to first-in-class blockbuster drugs, other
pharmaceutical firms rush to enter the market with similar compounds. 86
For example, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the
cholesterol-lowering drug pitavastatin in 2009, making it the eighth statin
drug approved in the US. 87 By that point, the first-in-class drug had already
88
entered the public domain and been available generically for eight years.
Although some of this behavior may be the result of efficient patent races
or of drugs that respond to heterogeneous patient needs, 89 many
commentators view "me too" drugs as producing little overall value. 90
While they do not add much in the way of additional therapeutic gains, they

80.

See Christopher Buccafusco, Disability and Design, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 952 (2020).

Carroll, supra note 22, at 1377 ("The information and product markets supported by
81.
intellectual property rights operate on the basis of users' ability to pay rather than willingness to pay to
reflect the social value of innovation. As a result, the innovations or innovators selected for reward by
'the market' will skew toward the interests of those with an ability to pay, who more often than not are
the relatively rich.").
82.
Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing Insurance:PrescriptionDrug Insurance as Innovation Incentive,
30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 153, 169 (2016) ("Consumers' willingness to pay for any particular product
depends on its value to them. However, the social value of a drug is often poorly measured by the sum
of its value to each individual consumer. There are often significant externalities associated with medical
innovations that redound to the benefit of society, rather than the consumer, and are therefore not
incorporated into individual willingness to pay.").
Lemley, Ouellette & Sachs, supra note 75, at 84 ("Part B covers all services and products
83.
which are 'reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury,' a phrase which
is defined neither by the statute nor by regulations.").
Hollis, supra note 44, at 5.
84.

Id.
85.
Joshua J. Gagne & Niteesh K. Choudhry, How Many "Me-Too " Drugs Is Too Many?, 305
86.
JAMA 711 (2011).
87.

Id. at 711.

88.
89.

Id.
Id.

90.

See, e.g., Bishal Gyawali & Vinay Prasad, Me-Too Drugs with Limited Benefits-The Tale

of Regorafenib for HCC, 14 NATURE REVS. CLIN. ONCOLOGY 653 (2017); Aaron

S.

Kesselheim et al.,

ClinicalEquivalence of Generic and Brand-Name Drugs Used in Cardiovascular Disease: A Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis, 300 JAMA 2514 (2008); Aidan Hollis, Me-Too Drugs: Is There a Problem?
(Dec. 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/Me-tooDr

ugs _Hollis l.pdf.
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reduce the profits (and thus the incentives to invent) that accompany the
first-in-class drug. 9 1
On the other hand, some diseases that primarily affect small or poor
populations will not attract much investment, because the reward prospects
are insufficient to justify R&D expenditures. When people are not covered
by comprehensive insurance schemes like those in the developed world,
their ability to pay for lifesaving medication is seriously diminished.
Although better treatments for malaria and tuberculosis could have huge
impacts on global well-being, pharmaceutical firms may underinvest in
them because they will not make as much money as they can by treating
rich people's diseases. 92 In addition, diseases that affect small populations,
even if they are covered by insurance, will be undertreated by a
pharmaceutical industry driven by market rewards. 93 If only a few thousand
people may need a treatment, firms will be less likely to invest in it, even if
the treatment could produce much greater per-person benefits than other
treatments that are used by millions of people. The 1983 Orphan Drug Act 94
has taken some steps to address this issue, but for reasons we discuss in Part
III, we think it insufficiently aligns drugmakers' incentives with human
welfare.
The skewed nature of the US healthcare market also distorts
pharmaceutical companies' incentives toward drugs that treat diseases
rather than ones that cure them. 95 As Claire Xue and Lisa Ouellette argue,
drugmakers deciding between developing a vaccine that cures a disease
once and for all or developing a drug that merely treats the disease over time
might find the latter opportunity much more profitable. 96 Selling daily,
weekly, or monthly treatments may be far more lucrative than selling a
single-dose cure, but the cure is hugely more valuable in terms of social
welfare because it produces significant positive externalities and can lead,
ultimately, to eradication of the disease. 97

91.
92.

Hollis, supra note 44, at 5.
See Michael Kremer, Pharmaceuticalsand the Developing World, 16 J. ECON. PERSPS. 67,

68-69 (2002).
93.

Bryan A. Liang & Tim Mackey, Reforming Off-Label Promotion to Enhance Orphan

Disease Treatment, 327 SCi. 273 (2010).
21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a).
94.
95.

See Qiwei Claire Xue & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy and the Marketfor

Vaccines, 7 J.L. & BioscIs. 1 (2020); Ana Santos Rutschman, The Vaccine Race in the 21st Century, 61
Ariz. L. REV. 729 (2019); Lemley, Ouellette & Sachs, supranote 75, at 119-20.
Xue & Oullette, supra note 95, at 20.
96.

97.

Id. at 21-24.
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D. Can the FDA Help?
We might hope that the FDA, as the regulatory body that oversees the
market for pharmaceuticals, could help solve some of these concerns. In
many respects, however, the FDA is poorly positioned to respond. When
approving drugs, the FDA does not condition marketability on costeffectiveness. 98 If a drug is deemed safe and effective, it can be approved
for marketing. In addition, the length of the FDA's clinical trials further
distorts R&D spending. 99 And efforts to limit the duration and expense of
clinical trials likely produce worse data on therapeutic value, allowing more
low-quality pharmaceuticals on the market. 10 0 The considerable number of
"reversals" of clinical trials, showing that drugs may be no better-or far
worse-than existing alternatives, indicates the scope of the problem.10 1
In the US, the FDA regulates the marketability of pharmaceuticals. The
FDA will only approve the sale of a pharmaceutical drug to patients if the
firm that wants to sell the drug (usually the patent owner) can prove that it
is safe and effective.1 0 2 Typically, this involves several rounds of clinical
trials that initially determine whether the drug is toxic in non-human and
human populations and then consider whether it effectively treats one or
more diseases. But "effective" as used in the law and as interpreted by the
FDA does not necessarily mean that the treatment is better than existing
treatments, and it certainly does not mean that the new treatment is a costeffective one. A drug's sponsor need only generate data demonstrating that
the drug produces some improvement in outcomes for at least a
subpopulation of those with the disease.1 03 This data often comes from
studies run by the patent owners,1 04 and there are many commentators who
are concerned about statistical manipulation of trial results.' 05 A burgeoning
98.
Denise Roland, ObscureModel Puts a Priceon Good Health-andDrives Down Drug Costs,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 4, 2019) https://www.wsj.com/articles/obscure-model-puts-a-price-on-good-healtha
nd-drives-down-drug-costs-1 1572885123.

99.
Budish, Roin & Williams, supra note 27, at 2044-45.
100. Vinay Prasad, Do Cancer Drugs Improve Survival or Quality of Life?, 359 BRIT. MED. J.
(Oct. 4, 2017); John Mandrola, Adam Cifu, Vinay Prasad & Andrew Foy, The Casefor Being a Medical
Conservative, AM. J. MED. 900 (2019); Diana Herrera-Perez, Alyson Haslam, Tyler Crain, Jennifer Gill,
Catherine Livingston, Victoria Kaestner, Michael Hayes, Dan Morgan, Adam S. Cifu & Vinay Prasad,

A ComprehensiveReview of Randomized Clinical Trials in Three MedicalJournalsReveals 396 Medical
Reversals, 8 ELIFE 1, 2 (2019); Margaret Kyle & Heidi Williams, Is American Health Care Uniquely
Inefficient? Evidencefrom PrescriptionDrugs, 107 AM. ECON. REv. 486 (2017).
101. Herrera-Perez et al., supra note 100, at 1 ("Medical reversals are a subset of low-value
medical practices and are defined as practices that have been found, through randomized controlled
trials, to be no better than a prior or lesser standard of care.") (citation omitted).

102.

See 21 U.S.C.

§ 355(d).

103. Sukhatme & Bloche, supranote 78, at 982.
104. Chi Heem Wong, Kien Wei Siah & Andrew Lo, Estimation of Clinical Trial Success Rates
and Related Parameters, 20 BIOSTATS. 273, 273 (2019).
105. See, e.g., Prasad, supranote 100; Kapczynski, supranote 44, at 2369.
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medical literature has described numerous flaws in FDA clinical trials,
including the use of non-clinical (i.e., non-human) data, 106 the lack of
108
randomly-controlled trials, 107 and non-representative study populations,
109
all of which tend to overstate a drug's efficacy.
Further, research by Eric Budish, Benjamin Roin, and Heidi Williams
has shown how variations in the length of FDA clinical trials affect firms'
R&D choices. 1 0 US patent law gives inventors a fixed 20-year term of
protection, but the effective length of market exclusivity is shortened by the
time it takes to conduct clinical trials.1" Thus, the shorter the clinical trials,
the longer the effective patent term. Generally, treatments for late-stage
cancers involve shorter clinical trials than early-stage cancers, because it
takes less time to demonstrate potential effectiveness.12 With late-stage
cancers, patients die much more quickly, so success or failure happens
sooner. The authors demonstrate that firns have responded to this effective
manipulation of patent duration by focusing significantly greater resources
on late-stage cancer research than early-stage cancer research-even though
treating early-stage cancers would likely produce much greater social value.
While reasonable minds could differ about the FDA's success at
ensuring the quality of pharmaceuticals available in the US, there is no
doubt that it has failed to help with cost containment. This is because the
FDA does not evaluate a drug's cost-effectiveness as a condition of its
approval.' 1 3 Thus, if a drug's sponsor can show that it will make even a
modest improvement in treatment outcomes for some group of potential
patients, the FDA will approve the drug even though its cost may be many
times greater than alternative treatments. 1 4 It is not entirely surprising that
the FDA does not consider a drug's cost in its approval decisions,
considering where the agency sits in the product's lifecycle. At the time the
FDA decides whether to approve a drug, it has not been on the market, and
106. James D. Chambers, Teja Thorat, Colby L. Wilkinson & Peter J. Neumann, Drugs Cleared
Through the FDA's Expedited Review Offer Greater Gains than Drugs Approved by Conventional

Process, 36 HEALTH AFFS. 1408 (2017).
107. Brett K. Beaulieu-Jones, Samuel G. Finlayson, William Yuan, Russ B. Altman, Isaac S.
Kohane, vinay Prasad, & Kun-Hsing Yu, Examining the Use ofReal-World Evidence in the Regulatory
Process, 107 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 843 (2020).
108. See Chadi Nabhan, Andrew Klink & vinay Prasad, Real-World Evidence-What Does It

Really Mean?, 5 JAMA ONCOLOGY 781 (2019); see also Beaulieu-Jones et al., supra note 107.
109. See Mandrola et al., supra note 100.
110. Budish, Roin & Williams, supranote 27, at 2.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 3.
113. Laura Lorenzetti, Is It Time for the FDA to Consider Cost when It Comes to New Drugs?,
FORTUNE (Feb. 4, 2015, 9:45 AM), https://fortune.com/2015/02/04/is-it-time-for-the-fda-to-consider-co
st-when-i t-comes-to-new-drugs/.
114. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). Many European countries have more advanced systems of health
technology assessment than the US does. See Corinna Sorenson & Kalipso Chalkidou, Reflections on
the Evolution of Health Technology Assessment in Europe, 7 HEALTH ECON., POL'Y & L. 25, 26 (2012).
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thus its price is not yet known. Accordingly, there may be little the FDA can
do to connect patents with aggregate social utility.

The pharmaceutical industry is thought to show the patent system at its
best, incentivizing breakthrough innovations that would not have come
about but for the promise of exclusive rights. 1 5 But patent law's one-sizefits-all, market-oriented approach has drawn attention to the ways in which
it may fail to maximize social value. Is there an alternative? Could we figure
out which innovations are, in fact, generating the most social value? And if
so, could patent law do anything to incentivize research in those directions?
We turn to these questions in the next two Parts.

II. CONNECTING PHARMA PATENTS TO THEIR EFFECTS ON WELL-BEING
Although we may never know how much each of the hundreds of patents
involved in smartphone technology affects human well-being, new data are
able to estimate the relative effects of pharmaceutical patents on welfare.
Recent research in hedonic psychology-the scientific study of well-being
and happiness-is providing increasingly valid and reliable tools for
measuring how various experiences, including taking pharmaceuticals,
affects people's lives." 6 That data can be combined with data on the patents
associated with pharmaceuticals to study whether and to what extent various
patents are making people better off. First, we discuss the methodological
strategies of connecting patents with well-being data, and then we report
some results from recent studies of the efficacy of pharmaceutical
innovations. Ultimately, the story is decidedly mixed: although some new
pharmaceuticals are dramatically improving patients' lives, many others are
no better or worse than established alternatives.
A. Patents, QALYs, and Well-Being
The first challenge in connecting patents with their effects on welfare is
isolating the patents involved in pharmaceutical products. Recent research
115. Burk & Lemley, supra note 45, at 1578.
116. See Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz eds., 1999); Ed Diener,
Richard E. Lucas, Ulrich Schimmack & John Helliwell, Defining Well-being, in WELL-BEING FOR
PUBLIC POLICY (Ed Diener, Richard E. Lucas, Ulrich Schimmack & John Helliwell eds., 2009); William
S. Comanor, Stuart O. Schweitzer & Tanja Carter, A Hedonic Model of Pricing of Innovative
Pharmaceuticals,in HEALTH POLICY AND HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: LEARNING FROM
INNOVATION IN THE HEALTH INDUSTRY (Marco R. Di Tommaso & Stuart O. Schweitzer eds., 2005);
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013).
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by Scott Hemphill and Bhaven Sampat has shown this to be possible."' The
Hatch-Waxman Act requires drug companies to list the most pertinent
patents covering a drug in the FDA publication Approved Drug Products
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, also known as the Orange
Book.1 18 Hemphill and Sampat find that while each drug is associated with,
on average, 2.7 total patents, almost all drugs are covered by a single "active
ingredient" patent.1 19 After this patent expires, generic versions of the drug
tend to enter the market. 12 0 In separate analysis, David Abrams and Sampat
have explored which of the multiple patents associated with a drug is chosen
for extension under the Hatch-Waxman Act's period of regulatory
compensation.121 Using this approach, they can assess which patent covers
the active or main ingredient in the drug, and their findings strongly
correlate with Hemphill and Sampat's data.122
The bigger empirical challenge involves connecting pharmaceutical
patents to their effects on patient welfare, but new research is now making
this possible. Much of this research is inspired by the field of hedonic
psychology, which attempts to scientifically measure how well individuals'
lives are going. 12 3 Over the last several decades, scientists have made
considerable strides in developing valid and reliable tools for studying and
comparing people's experiences. This work reflects a turn from decision
utility-judging people's welfare based on the choices they make-toward
experience utility-judging people's welfare based on how they feel about
their experiences. 12 1

117. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613 (2011) [hereinafter Hemphill & Sampat, DrugPatents]; C. Scott Hemphill
& Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, andEffective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals,
31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327 (2012) [hereinafter Hemphill & Sampat, Evergreening].
118. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Rsch., Food & Drug Admin., Approved Drug Products with
TherapeuticEquivalence Evaluations (40th ed. 2019).
119. Hemphill & Sampat, Evergreening,supra note 117, at 330.
120. Hemphill & Sampat, Drug Patents, supranote 117, at 615.
121. Abrams & Sampat, supra note 57, at 1, 8.
122. Id. at 8. There is now ample evidence that drug companies file additional patents related to
their active ingredient patents in an attempt to extend periods of exclusivity. Amy Kapczynski, Chan
Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An Empirical Analysis of
"Secondary" PharmaceuticalPatents, 7 PLOS ONE 1 (2012); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Note, How
Many Patents Does It Take to Make a Drug? Follow-On PharmaceuticalPatents and University
Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 299 (2010). These patents typically cover different
formulations of the active ingredient or alternative dosage regimes and delivery mechanisms. This
strategy, known as "evergreening," raises a number of concerns about the length and breadth of
pharmaceutical patents, but it does not affect researchers' ability to isolate the principal active ingredient
patent associated with each drug. Accordingly, we are confident that in the great majority of cases, it
will be possible to determine the patent that supports the pharmaceutical.
123. Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based
Approach, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 673 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).

124.

Id.
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The shift toward experiences is especially appropriate in the context of
pharmaceuticals for a number of reasons. First, as we have seen, people's
choices about which drugs they take are not likely to be strong proxies for
their welfare, due to the numerous distortions of the drug market.1 2 1
Although we might trust people to choose whether they will get more
happiness from a Ford or a Jaguar, we should be less confident that their
choices between medications-if they even get to make any-are rational
and well-informed.1 2 6 Second, pharmaceuticals affect people's lives in a
variety of different ways, and policymakers should have data that reflect
those experiences. Measuring the success of a new drug solely in terms of
patients' five-year survival rates ignores an enormous amount of
information that we might care about.1 2 7 Obviously, many drugs treat
conditions that do not cause death. Knowing that the five-year survival rate
of an acne medication is above 99% tells us very little about the drug's
effectiveness. In addition, many people are likely to care not just about their
absolute survival but also the quality of their lives.1 2 8 People might
rationally believe that surviving for three years in fairly good health is better
than surviving for five years in miserable health.1 2 9 Accordingly, scientists
need tools that will capture the nuances of patients' experiences.
We believe that the best way to measure a drug's effect on well-being is
to follow the practices of hedonic psychology by surveying people who are
taking the drug and asking them how they are feeling. 130 As we have argued
at length elsewhere, the best way to study people's welfare is to measure the
range of positive and negative emotions that they experience.' 3' Research
tools such as the experience sampling method (ESM), which uses
smartphones to randomly query people about what they are doing and how
happy or unhappy they are, can provide fine-grained data about individual
well-being. 3 2 People's self-reports about their current experiences generate
125. See Bronsteen et al., supra note 116, at 1607; see also Tara O'Neill Hayes, Market
Distortions Causedby the 340B PrescriptionDrug Program,AM. ACTION F. (Nov. 28, 2017), https://w
ww.americanactionforum.org/research/340bmarketdistortions/ [https://perma.cc/RWU2-6DWJ].

126.

Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WAsH. L. REV. 1255 (2017);

Hollis, supra note 44, at 3.

127.

Daniel Chisholm, Andrew Healy & Martin Knapp, QAL Ys andMental Health Care, 32 Soc.

PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 68, 68 (1997).

128. Milton C. Weinstein, George Torrance & Alistair McGuire, QALYs: The Basics, 12 VALUE
HEALTH S5, S5 (2009).
129. Amiram Gafni, Economic Evaluation of Health-Care Programmes: Is CEA Better than
CBA?, 34 ENV'T & RES. ECON. 407, 408 (2006).

130.
131.

Bronsteen et al., supra note 116, at 1617.
Jd. at 1617-20.

132.

See Iris H.L. Maes, Philippe A.E.G. Delespaul, Madelon L. Peters, Matthew P. White, Yvette

van Horn, Koen Schruers, Lucien Anteunis & Manuela Joore, MeasuringHealth-RelatedQuality ofLife
by Experiences: The Experience Sampling Method, 18 VALUE HEALTH 44, 44 (2015); Alan B. Krueger,
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the most valid and reliable data on how they are doing. 133 For our purposes,
we could imagine studies that track individuals' responses to ESM questions
during their treatment with a patented pharmaceutical and compare them to
responses from people who are using an alternative treatment.1 34 Studies
like these would provide extraordinarily precise data about individual
treatment, including information about their health states and also their
emotions and moods. '35 Although such studies would provide the "gold
standard" for well-being comparisons, they are expensive to run (especially
for long periods of time) and could create considerable impositions on
patients.1 36
For longer term effects, such as for treatments that last several years or
more, scientists can use other means for measuring people's experiences.
One of the most common forms of hedonic psychology research relies on
questions about people's life satisfaction, which are typically included in
larger survey instruments such as the General Social Survey.' 37 Life
satisfaction surveys include one or more questions that ask respondents
something like: "All things considered, how satisfied with your life are you
these days?"138 Although life satisfaction surveys do not provide the finegrained data of ESM studies, they can be used to track people through
treatments over a longer period of time.' 39 For example, researchers have

Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, Norbert Schwarz & Arthur A. Stone, National Time Accounting:
The Currency of Life, in MEASURING THE SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING OF NATIONS: NATIONAL
ACCOUNTS OF TIME USE AND WELL-BEING 9, 30 (Alan B. Krueger ed., 2009).
133. See Diener et al., supra note 116, at 71-73; Dylan M. Smith, Ryan L. Sherriff, Laura
Damschroder, George Loewenstein, & Peter A. Ubel, Misremembering Colostomies? Former Patients

Give Lower Utility Ratings than Do Current Patients, 25 HEALTH PSYCH. 688, 691 (2006).
134.

See Inez Myin-Germeys, Zuzana Kasanova, Thomas Vaessen, Hugo vachon, Olivia Kirtley,

Wolfgang viechtbauer & Ulrich Reininghaus, Experience Sampling Methodology in Mental Health
Research: New Insights and Technical Developments, 17 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 123, 123 (2018).
135. Ingrid Kramer, Claudia J.P. Simons, Jessica A, Hartmann, Claudia Menne-Lothmann,
Wolfgang Viechtbauer, Frenk Peeters, Koen Schruers, Alex L. van Bemmel, Inez Myin-Germeys,

Philippe Delespaul, Jim van Os & Marieke wichers, A Therapeutic Application of the Experience
Sampling Method in the Treatment of Depression: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 13 WORLD
PSYCHIATRY 68, 68 (2014).
136. Alan B. Krueger et al., supra note 132, at 30.
137. Diener et al., supra note 116, at 19.
138. See William Pavot & Ed Diener, Review of the Satisfaction with Life Scale, 5 PSYCH.
ASSESSMENT 164, 164 (1993) (discussing the strength of the Satisfaction with Life Scale and referring
to the fact that it is a "judgmental process, in which individuals assess the quality of their lives on the
basis of their own unique set of criteria").
139. Andrew E. Clark, Ed Diener, Yannis Georgellis & Richard E. Lucas, Lags and Leads in Life

Satisfaction: A Test of the Baseline Hypothesis, 118 ECON. J. F222, F231 (2008).

2021 ]

DRUGS, PATENTS, AND WELL-BEING

1423

used life satisfaction data to explore patients' experiences with different
treatments for breast cancer,1 40 kidney transplants,141 and ADHD.1 4 2
As we have explained in prior work, policymakers can use data from
ESM and life satisfaction surveys to compute the number of "well-being
units" (WBUs) that people experience as a result of some change in an
aspect of their lives.' 4 3 The best hedonic surveys track individual well-being
on a scale of -10 to 10, where 0 is equivalent to death or unconsciousness,
and the ends of the scale represent the extremes of negative and positive
experience. (Negative numbers represent experiences that are worse than
unconsciousness, such as invasive dental work.) One WBU is equivalent to
one point on the hedonic scale for one person for one year.'44 Thus, if an
individual took a drug that raised her well-being from 7 to 8 for one year,
that drug would have created one WBU of welfare. If ten people each took
a drug that raised their well-being from 5 to 8, and they took these drugs
over a period of ten years, this would yield an overall gain of 10 people x 3
points x 10 years = 300 WBUs. The use of WBUs thus offers a mechanism
for rigorously measuring welfare changes over time, including those
attributable to external factors such as new drugs.
Although ESM and life satisfaction studies are increasingly popular,
there are more available data that analyze medical treatments using a metric
called Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs).1 45 While it is important to
know how many lives a new drug saves or how many years it adds to
patients' expected survival, these data paint an incomplete picture of the
drug's effects on well-being. As we noted, the quality of a person's life is
as important to her welfare as is its length, and the QALY provides a
mechanism for studying the effects of different medical treatments.' 46 Many
European countries mandate QALY comparisons for health technology
Marianne Carlsson, Maria Arman, Marie Backman, Ursula Flatters, Thomas Hatschek

&

140.

Elisabeth Hamrin, Evaluation of Quality of Life/Life Satisfaction in Women with Breast Cancer in
Complementary and Conventional Care, 43 ACTA ONCOLOGICA 27 (2004).
141.

Arthur J. Matas, R.J. Halbert, Mark L. Barr, J. Harold Helderman, Donald E. Hricik, John D.

Pirsch, Felicia A. Schenkel, Bonita R. Siegal, Honghu Liu & Ronald M. Ferguson, Life Satisfaction and
Adverse Effects in Renal Transplant Recipients: A Longitudinal Analysis, 16 CLINICAL
TRANSPLANTATION 113 (2002).
142. Aribert Rothenberger, Andreas Becker, Dieter Breuer & Manfred D~pfner, An Observational

Study of Once-Daily Modified-Release Methylphenidate in ADHD: Quality of Life, Satisfaction with
Treatment, and Adherence, 20 EUR. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY S257 (2011).
143. Bronsteen et al., supra note 116, at 1643.
144. Id. at 1643-44.
145. Chisholm et al., supra note 127, at 69-70; Sarah J. Whitehead & Shehzad Ali, Health
Outcomes in Economic Evaluation: The QALY and Utilities, 96 BRIT. MED. BULL. 5, 13-14 (2010);
Nancy J. Devlin & Paula K. Lorgelly, QALYs as a Measure of Value in Cancer, 11 J. CANCER POL'Y
19, 20-21 (2017).
146. Chisolm et al., supra note 127, at 68 ("[T]he QALY transcends unidimensional measures
such as life expectancy improvements or 5-year survival rates as indicators of the success or failure of
medical intervention.").
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appraisals and cost-effectiveness studies because QALYS provide a single
measure for evaluating alternatives.1 47 Accordingly, pharmaceutical
companies also have significant experience with them.1 48
To measure QALYs, researchers assess the number of years of life
gained from a new treatment relative to the status quo treatment.' 49 Then
they discount (i.e., multiply) those additional life years by the health-related
quality of life (HRQoL) that patients experience during them." 0 HRQoL is
assessed on a scale that runs from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates perfect health
and 0 indicates death.151 Negative numbers can represent states worse than
unconsciousness or death. 5 2 In most studies, researchers assess HRQoL
along several different dimensions, including the severity of problems with
and
pain,
usual
activities,
performing
self-care,
mobility,
anxiety/depression. 53 The relative weights of each of these domains is
judged by medical professions and members of the public, rather than
patients themselves (an issue we discuss further below). 5 4 For example, if
a new cancer treatment extends patients' lives by four years relative to the
status quo, and those four years are spent, on average, at a level of 0.65
HRQoL, then the drug is responsible for creating 4 x 0.65 = 2.6 QALYs per
patient. If one thousand patients receive the treatment, the drug would
generate 2,600 QALYs. In some European countries, these data are
combined with the cost of the treatment to determine whether it is cost
effective.15 5 In the next Part, we argue that the PTO can use QALY data to
manipulate the size of the incentives given to pharmaceutical companies.

147. Hollis, supra note 44, at 16 ("There is very extensive experience with evaluating QALYs
related to drug treatments, since a large number of governments and other insurers all over the world
use such an approach .... "); Whitehead & Ali, supra note 145, at 6 ("The use of QALYs is required by
the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK for health technology
assessment."); Hollis, supranote 44, at 2 ("While imperfect, the use of QALYs enables a comparison to
be made between the therapeutic benefits of different drugs in a standardized way and thus to find a
meaningful measure of the social value of an innovation. The implementation of the QALY technique
in deciding which pharmaceuticals to fund in a number ofjurisdictions around the world has been highly
successful, and it offers strong encouragement for a broader application of QALYs to determining how
to reward pharmaceutical innovations.").
148. Hollis, supra note 44, at 17 ("Drug companies have also used QALY-type analysis
themselves in order to demonstrate economic effectiveness of treatments.") (citation omitted).

149.
150.
151.

Devlin & Lorgelly, supra note 145, at 20.
Id.
Chisholm et al., supra note 127, at 68; see also Devlin & Lorgelly, supra note 145, at 20.

152. Devlin & Lorgelly, supra note 145, at 20 ("QALYs are estimated by multiplying the length
of life in each health state by its HRQoL weight. The weights are on a scale anchored at 1 (full health)
and 0 (a health state so bad it is as bad as being dead), with negative values indicating a health state
considered to be worse than being dead.").

153. Id.
154. Id. at 19-20.
155. Hollis, supra note 44, at 2.
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We should note, however, that QALY data are not a perfect proxy for
human welfare.15 6 There is no such measure, so the important question for
policymakers is whether QALYs are better than the alternative, which, in
this case, means no data at all. It is also important to be aware of the
limitations with using QALY data. First, QALYs are typically assessed with
reference to the patient receiving treatment, but medical treatments can have
many spillover effects.1 57 Vaccines and treatments for communicable
diseases help everyone in society, not just the people who receive them. And
a pharmaceutical that enables patients to return to work can improve the
lives of their children, spouses, and caregivers.1 58
In addition, as we explained, HRQoL weights are assessed by asking
medical professionals and members of the public how bad they think
various health states are.' 59 There is extensive evidence, though, that healthy
people make systematic mistakes when predicting how various health states
would make them feel.160 Because healthy people focus on becoming
unhealthy rather than being unhealthy, and because they do not account
sufficiently for the effects of hedonic adaptation to new experiences, they
tend to overestimate both the magnitude and duration of negative
experiences.161 In addition, QALY measurements focus primarily on
physical health rather than mental health and well-being, so they may not
fully capture the effects of a treatment on patients' feelings and emotions.' 62
Accordingly, they may understate the value of treatments for mental health
disorders or ones that increase pleasure. And they may less accurately assess
the experiences of people with disabilities. For these reasons, we encourage
156.

Devlin & Lorgelly, supra note 145, at 21.

157. Id. at 21.
158. See whitehead & Ali, supra note 145, at 17 ("[A]n improvement in the health of a
woman/man with children may impact on the health of their children and may also help her/him return
to work more quickly."); see also Devlin & Lorgelly, supra note 145, at 23 ("[T]here may be wider
benefits to society from treating cancer. For example, the reduced mortality and morbidity from cancer
may enable cancer patients to return to work more quickly, or to contribute in other (non-income earning)
ways to society, for example by caring for others or undertaking voluntary work.").
159. Whitehead & Ali, supra note 145, at 16.

160.

Id.

161. Peter A. Ubel, George Loewenstein & Christopher Jepson, Disability and Sunshine: Can
Hedonic Predictions Be Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional
Adaptation?, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 111, 111 (2005); Peter A. Ubel, George Loewenstein, John
Hershey, Jonathan Baron, Tara Mohr, David A. Asch & Christopher Jepson, Do Nonpatients
Underestimate the Quality of Life Associated with Chronic Health Conditions Because of a Focusing
Illusion?, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 190, 197 (2001).
162. Rebecca Johnson, David Jenkinson, Chris Stinton, Sian Taylor-Phillips, Jason Madan, Sarah
Stewart-Brown & Aileen Clarke, Where's WALY?: A Proofof Concept Study of the 'Wellbeing Adjusted
Life Year' Using Secondary Analysis of Cross-Sectional Survey Data, 14 HEALTH & QUALITY LIFE
OUTCOMES 126 (2016) ("[T]the fact that we found a ceiling effect in the EQ-5D-3L (as have others
before us, with nearly three quarters of participants at the maximum score reinforces the likelihood that
it does not capture relevant changes that matter to individuals or, therefore, to economic evaluations.")
(citation omitted).
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increased use of ESM studies for pharmaceuticals, but we believe that
QALY-based measures represent a vast improvement over the alternatives.
Until better well-being measures become widely available, QALYs are a
worthwhile mechanism for assessing health outcomes from drugs and
medical treatments.
B. Which PatentedPharmaceuticals Improve Well-Being?
The past two decades have witnessed increased efforts by scholars and
government agencies to assess the well-being impacts of new
pharmaceuticals.1 63 How often are they worth the enormous R&D
investments and astronomical prices? The data are decidedly mixed. New
treatments for some conditions have generated meaningful improvements
over earlier options, but the story for many other patented pharmaceuticals
is bleaker.' 64 Below we report the findings of a number of recent studies to
illustrate the broad variation in pharmaceutical effectiveness.
First, the good news. In a study of the relative effectiveness of new
pharmaceuticals approved by the FDA between 1999 and 2011, James
Chambers and colleagues report a number of drugs that produced
meaningful improvements over previous options.1 65 The two largest
successes in terms of QALYs per person were deferasirox (Exjade), which
treats hemosiderosis, an excess iron accumulation, and produces average
gains of 4.2 QALYs per person, and imatinib mesylate (Gleevec), which
treats leukemia and produces about 4.1 QALYs per person. 66 Although
these drugs come with astronomical price tags ($168,469 and $151,746
costs, respectively),' 6 7 they are doing a great deal of good for the patients
that receive them. Three additional drugs also produced at least one QALY
improvement over the status quo, and one of them, bosentan (Tracleer), a
treatment for pulmonary arterial hypertension, does so at a cost that is
$100,000 less that the alternative.1 68 Sixteen out of the 102 drugs in the
69
sample produced at least half of a QALY on average.1
Because policymakers care about the total welfare produced by new
pharmaceuticals and not just the welfare per patient, it is essential to know
whether drugs are treating large or small populations. Adding four QALYs

163.
164.

Nabhan et al., supra note 108, at 781.

Kyle, supra note 27, at 219.

165. James D. Chambers, Teja Thorat, Junhee Pyo, Matthew Chenoweth & Peter J. Neumann,
Despite High Costs, Specialty Drugs May Offer Value For Money Comparable to that of Traditional
Drugs, 33 HEALTH AFFS. 1751, 1752 (2014).

166.
167.
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Id.

168. Id.
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to one person's life is generally not as valuable as adding one QALY to one
hundred people's lives.170 While there certainly could be situations in which,
for distributional equity reasons, policymakers might favor providing
smaller benefits to one group over larger benefits to another, drugs that treat
larger populations are, all else equal, more socially valuable.171 Thus, from
the perspective of a policymaker, what typically matters most is overall
welfare across the entire population (though of course the policymaker
might want to focus on improving the welfare of those people who are least
well off). Hundreds of QALYs will always outweigh just a few QALYs.
Accordingly, in a subsequent study, Chambers and colleagues collected data
on the US incidence of diseases from the Centers for Disease Control and
the National Cancer Institute.' 72 They then calculated the aggregate number
of QALYs per pharmaceutical if ten percent of the population with the
condition received it. 17 3 Interestingly, the results differ meaningfully from
the previous study. Although imatinib (Gleevec) produced more than four
QALYs per person, only about 64,000 Americans suffer from the particular
form of leukemia that it treats.' 7 4 If ten percent of the 64,000 people took
7
the drug, its estimated aggregate benefit was only about 40,000 QALYs. m
By comparison, drugs that treated conditions with much higher incidence,
such as high cholesterol, diabetes, hepatitis C, HIV, and smoking addiction
generated significantly higher aggregate QALYs.1 76 For example,
approximately 67 million Americans suffer from high cholesterol, and
although ezetimibe only produced 0.172 QALYs per person compared to
the standard treatment, if ten percent of those people get the drug, it would
produce 1.1 million QALYs.1 77 Pioglitazone, which was approved to treat
type 2 diabetes in 1999, generates 0.170 QALYs per person, but if given to
ten percent of the 17 million people with the disease, it would create an
additional 696,680 QALYs.1 78 According to Chambers and colleagues'
170. Bronsteen et al., supra note 116, at 1632-33. But see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
140 (2009) ("[T]he principle of average utility directs society to maximize not the total but the average
utility (per capita).").
171. On the distributional concerns of IP policy, see, e.g., Margaret Chon, IntellectualProperty
and the Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006); Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59 STAN. L.
REV. 257 (2006).
172.

James D. Chambers, Teja Thorat, Colby L. Wilkinson, Mark Salem, Prasun Subedi, Sachin

J. Kamal-Bahl & Peter J. Neumann, EstimatingPopulation Health Benefits Associated with Specialty
and TraditionalDrugs in the Year Following ProductApproval, 15 APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH
POL'Y 227, 228-30 (2017).
173. Id. at 230. Ten percent was chosen to provide a conservative estimate. Id. It is, of course,
trivially easy to redo the math with different assumptions.

174.
-9#Sec15.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. at online supp., app. tbl.1, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs40258-016-0291
Id.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id.
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data, fourteen drugs would generate at least 100,000 QALYs under their
assumptions. 179
Unfortunately, for many more pharmaceuticals, the story is not as
promising. Many molecular entities that receive patents do not enter into
FDA clinical trials at all, presumably because their sponsors do not believe
they are likely to produce promising results. Of the drugs that do enter
clinical trials, the vast majority fail to win approval. In a new study, Chi
Heem Wong, Kien Wei Siah, and Andrew Lo estimate that only 13.8% of
drug development programs result in approval,180 and their estimates are
higher than some others.181 In 2019, the FDA only approved forty-eight
novel drugs, and nine of these were approved on the basis of surrogate
endpoints rather than clinical ones. 8 2 This means that the drugs could gain
approval without showing a direct treatment effect if they could at least
show some positive effect on another "surrogate" outcome that is correlated
with the treatment effect. 83 But relying on surrogate endpoints rather than
clinical ones can dramatically overestimate a drug's total therapeutic
effect.' 8 4 Thus, most patented pharmaceuticals fail to meet the FDA's
standards for safety and effectiveness, and those that meet them may do so
on data of dubious reliability.' 85
In addition, the fact that the FDA has judged a drug to be effective does
not mean that the drug represents an improvement over existing treatment
options. In their series of studies, Chambers and his colleagues estimated
that a significant fraction of new drugs were no more effective or less
effective than existing options. That is, they produced zero or negative
QALYs.1 86 One of their studies found this to be true for 29% of the drugs
studied,' 87 and another estimated that 32% had zero or negative QALY
179.
180.

Id.
Wong, Siah & Lo, supranote 104, at 277.

181.

Michael Hay, David W. Thomas, John L. Craighead, Celia Economides & Jesse Rosenthal,

Clinical Development Success Rates for Investigational Drugs, 32 NATURE BIOTECH. 40, 48 (2014)
(estimating a 10.4% success rate); DAVID W. THOMAS, JUSTIN BURNS, JOHN AUDETTE, ADAM
CARROLL, COREY DOW-HYGELUND & MICHAEL HAY, BIO, CLINICAL DEVELOPMENT SUCCESS RATES
2006--2015 3 (2016) (estimating a 9.6% success rate).
182. Asher Mullard, 2019 FDA Drug Approvals, 19 NATURE REVS. 79 (2020). The five-year
rolling average is forty-four approvals per year. Id. at 79.

183.

Ross L. Prentice, Surrogate Endpoints in Clinical Trials: Definition and Operational

Criteria,8 STAT. MED. 431, 431-40 (1989); Beauliue-Jones et al., supra note 107, at 844.
184. Robert Kemp & Vinay Prasad, SurrogateEndpoints in Oncology: When Are They Acceptable
for Regulatory and Clinical Decisions, and Are They Currently Overused, 15 BMC MED. 134 (2017);

see also Beauliue-Jones et al., supranote 107, at 844.
185. In addition, many clinical trials are run by the drug's sponsoring firm rather than by
independent organizations, and the trials involve ideal patient populations who are likely to respond
better to the treatment than will real world populations. See Herrera-Perez et al., supranote 100, at 2-3;
Nabhan et al., supranote 108, at 781-82.
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impact.188 In the latter study of 102 new drugs, nineteen were "dominated"
by the alternative. That is, they were both less effective and more expensive
than the comparator treatment.' 89 Moreover, another one-third of the drugs
in this study generated fewer than 0.1 incremental QALYs.1 90 Importantly,
many of these poorly performing drugs would not treat especially large
populations, so their aggregate therapeutic value is also low (or negative).
These disappointing results have been corroborated by other studies
using different datasets. Abrams and Sampat studied new molecular entities
approved in the United States between 1987 and 2011.191 The median
incremental QALY improvement per drug was only 0.09 (approximately
one additional month of life at perfect health), and 25% of the drugs in their
sample have negative incremental QALYs. 9 2
Margaret Kyle analyzed 352 new pharmaceuticals that reached the
market between 2000 and 2016.193 She compared these drugs' prices to their
assessments by France's Haute Authorit6 de Sant, which scores drugs
based on whether they represent improvements over existing standards.' 94
Major improvements are scored 1, while those with no additional benefit
are scored 5.195 Perhaps unsurprisingly, imatinib (Gleevec) scored 1.196 But
almost half of the drugs in the sample (169) received a score of 5, while
another quarter received a score of 4.'97 Despite their poor performance,
however, these low scoring drugs were not significantly cheaper than their
higher scoring counterparts.' 98
These sorts of relatively useless "me too" drugs nevertheless exist
because the market for pharmaceuticals creates incentives for firms to
develop them. Even if a drug represents at most a very incremental
improvement on the status quo, it might succeed in winning a sizeable
market share through effective marketing and outreach. The drug could
become highly profitable even without contributing significantly to welfare,
compared with treatments that preceded it. Thus, while pharmaceutical
companies have produced some important breakthrough drugs that have
benefitted thousands of patients, they have also produced many products
that are outright failures from the standpoint of therapeutic outcomes

188.

Chambers et al., supra note 165, at 1755.
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190.
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(though not necessarily from the standpoint of profit). As we discuss in the
next section, these failures have considerable social costs.
C. Innovation FailuresAre Socially Costly
If the authors of this paper were to quit their jobs as professors to form a
boy band, their decision would primarily generate private costs for
themselves and their families. Having invested resources in a project with
no possible audience, they would fail to recoup their costs. This is the
disciplining power of the market. But the market for pharmaceuticals is
different, for the reasons discussed in Part I. These differences mean that
resources invested in drugs with negligible therapeutic benefits also produce
meaningful social costs.' 99
Like all patents, pharmaceuticals that generate little therapeutic value
still create administrative costs for an expensive regulatory system that
approves and monitors them. Here, that includes both the costs of running
the PTO and the costs of running the FDA. 200 In addition, because low value
patents are still valid, competitors will have to search for them to determine
whether their own inventions face litigation risk. 2 0' And having discovered
the existence of previously granted patents, competitors will expend costs
either licensing or designing around those patents. 202 These expenses
20 3
increase the costs of R&D and, potentially, the costs to consumers.
There are important opportunity costs as well. When firms are
incentivized to maximize private value rather than social value, they invest
resources that could have been otherwise better spent. 204 As we have noted,
pharmaceutical firms can obtain significant profits by producing "me too"
20
drugs that treat conditions that are treated just as well by existing options. s
In a world of infinite R&D resources, we would not be worried about firms
investing in pharmaceutical innovations that only produced modest
improvements or that only treated tiny populations. But in reality, firms face
capital constraints on their R&D, 206 so more money spent pursuing low
199. Paul Grootendorst, How Should We Support PharmaceuticalInnovation?, 9 EXPERT REV.
PHARMACOECON. OUTCOMES RSCH. 313, 315-16 (2009).
200. The PTO's annual appropriation is over $2 billion. Deepak Hegde, FundingandPerformance
at the US Patent and Trademark Office, 30 NATURE BIOTECH. 148, 148 (2012). The FDA spends about
$2 billion of its annual budget on human drugs. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., JUSTIFICATION OF
ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 73 (2020).

201.

Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patentand Copyright, 90 vA. L. REV. 465, 469 (2004).
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Buccafusco et al., supranote 39, at 19.
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Masur, supra note 47, at 687.
Stephane Regnier, What Is the Value of 'Me-Too' Drugs?, 16 HEALTH CARE MGMT. SCI.

300, 312 (2013); Wineinger, Zhang & Topol, supra note 77, at 7.
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social value drugs means that less money will be spent developing high
social value drugs.
Although "me too" drugs ostensibly inject some degree of competition
into the market and should decrease the prices of first-in-the-market drugs,
the evidence for price reductions is mixed. 207 Pharmaceutical companies
determine the price of their drug at market entrance according to when they
anticipate branded competitors will enter the market, and they may lower
prices over time to stay competitive. 208 Additionally, the entry of more
branded competitors into the market seems to result in slowed price
increases over time. 209 However, Nathan Wineinger and colleagues' recent
analysis of trends in drug prices between 2012 and 2017 indicates that price
increases are nearly universal, and branded drugs and their "me too"
variants tend to have matching cost increases. 2 10
Even if the introduction of a "me too" drug reduced the price of the drug,
it might not increase the number of consumers who are able to access the
drug. For instance, generic competition will typically reduce the price of a
drug. But some evidence suggests that even the introduction of a generic
competitor to a previously patented drug has little effect on the total
consumption of the medication, likely because consumers were already able
to afford the drug through insurance. 21 And although "me too" drugs may
not meaningfully increase access to blockbuster drugs, they do, nonetheless,
take market share.2 12 This means that the competition created by "me too"
drugs may fail to benefit consumers through greater access while
simultaneously reducing returns to the pioneer drugs that made significant
innovations. 1 3

207. Hollis, supra note 44, at 5 ("However, since me-too drugs do not typically result in large
price reductions, it is likely that they attract more investment than is socially optimal."); Wineinger,
Zhang & Topol, supra note 77, at 7 ("This finding suggests that prices of brand-name drugs are not
largely affected by the presence of generic drugs or perhaps biosimilar products and others that may
enter the market in the future.").
208. R6gnier, supra note 205, at 307-08; Joseph A. DiMasi & Cherie Paquette, The Economics of
Follow-on Drug Research and Development, 22 PHARMACOECON. supp. 2, 1 (2004).
209. Z. John Lu & William S. Comanor, Strategic Pricing of New Pharmaceuticals, 80 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 108, 116 (1998) ("More numerous rivals have the expected effect of slowing price
increases.").
210. Wineinger, Zhang & Topol, supranote 77, at 6.
211. Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Does Intellectual Property Restrict Output? An
Analysis of PharmaceuticalMarkets, 55 J.L. & ECON. 151, 153-54 (2012).
212. R6gnier, supra note 205, at 305 ("The 'average' me-too drug was launched 2.5 years (10
quarters) after the first entrant . .. and captured 38.5% of market share.").
213. Hollis, supra note 44, at 6 ("Not only is the R&D investment into "me-too" drugs likely
excessive, me-too products harm the returns available to pioneer drugs by capturing market share from
them even before patent expiry. This harms the incentive to undertake research into pioneer drugs, to
the extent that the innovator expects a reduction in its period of exclusivity.").
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III. CREATING INCENTIVES FOR WELFARE-ENHANCING DRUGS

The central objective of our paper is to bridge the divide we have
described in the preceding Parts between market outcomes and welfarethat is, between drugs that will earn considerable amounts of money and
drugs that will significantly improve welfare. In this Part, we propose a
linked pair of patent law mechanisms aimed at encouraging pharmaceutical
firms to invest resources in developing drugs that enhance welfare.
Simultaneously, we hope to discourage firms from investing in developing
drugs that have only a limited effect on welfare, including "me too" drugs
that largely duplicate existing drugs that are already on the market.2 14
A. Extending Patentsfor Beneficial Pharmaceuticals
By way of example, consider a firm that is deciding whether to invest in
two drugs, Drug A and Drug B. Drug A is a typical "me too" drug-it treats
a condition (high cholesterol) for which there are already very good drugs
on the market, and it does so only slightly more effectively than existing
treatments.m But the market for drugs that treat this condition is enormous,
and if Drug A can capture only part of that market it could be highly
profitable. By contrast, Drug B treats a disease that disproportionately
afflicts poorer people in the United States and Europe who face greater
exposure to environmental toxins than do people living in wealthier
communities.216 Because the existing treatments are limited and produce
serious side effects, the introduction of Drug B would have a significant
effect on overall welfare. But the drug might not turn out to be especially
profitable. Most of the people who would want to take the drug are poor,
and so their capacity to purchase the drug would depend on their access to
health insurance and the reimbursement rates of Medicaid. 217 From a social
welfare perspective, we would much prefer that the firm invest in
developing Drug B. But the firm, thinking only of its own bottom line, is
quite likely to select the more profitable Drug A instead. What is needed is

214.

drugs).
215.

Gagne & Choudhry, supra note 86, at 711 (describing the relative uselessness of "me too"

Cf Rena Goldman, Cholesterol Count: 4 NaturalStatins, HEALTH LINE (Apr. 30, 2019), https
[https://perma.cc/KCD5-QJ5K]
://www.healthline.com/health/high-cholesterol/natural-statins
(describing the many statins available to treat high cholesterol).
216. Beverly Wright, Living and Dying in Louisiana's "Cancer Alley," in THE QUEST FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION 87, 88-93 (Robert D.
Bullard ed., 2005) (explaining how pollution tends to be concentrated geographically, typically near
poorer communities and communities of color, due to land use decisions by policymakers).
217. Robert Capettini, David A. Dittman & Richard C. Morey, Reimbursement Rate Setting for
MedicaidPrescriptionDrugs Basedon Relative Efficiencies, 4 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL'Y 83, 86-91 (1985).
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some legal mechanism that would create additional incentives for the firm
to pursue Drug B (or dampen its incentives to pursue Drug A).
Our principal lever is the patent term. We propose extending the patent
term for patents that are producing significant welfare gains. Patents are
valid for twenty years from the date on which an application is filed. 2 18 But
pharmaceutical drugs typically do not reach the market until many years
after the filing of a patent application because of the need to run clinical
trials and secure FDA approval. 219 This means that the typical period of
market exclusivity is only ten to fourteen years. 2 0
Despite the relatively short patent term, the useful life of a
pharmaceutical can extend for decades (or even centuries).221 (Contrast this
with technologies such as electronics, which are often obsolete after only a
few years. 222 ) This means that when a drug patent expires, the underlying
drug is often still selling quite well and would remain valuable to the firm
producing it if the patent remained in force. 23 Extending the patent term
would produce significant additional revenue. Of course, the point is not to
reward firms that have invented drugs that are already in existence-once
the drug has come into existence, no further inducement is necessary.22 4
Rather, the point is that the possibility of obtaining these additional patent
rewards should figure into the firm's decision about which drugs to pursue
ex ante.22' The potential for earning an extended patent term should place a
thumb on the scale in favor of drugs that will meaningfully enhance welfare,
thus increasing the number of such drugs that are produced and the rate at
which firms undertake those projects.
In order for firms to be responsive to these enhanced incentives, they
must (1) have some sense of the likely welfare gains from their drugs, and
(2) take into account the possibility of enhanced patent terms. But there are
218.
219.

35 U.S.C. § 154.
ROBIN J. STRONGIN, NAT' L HEALTH POL'Y F., HATCH-WAXMAN, GENERICS, AND PATENTS:

BALANCING PRESCRIPTION DRUG INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND AFFORDABILITY (2002).
220.

Benjamin N. Roin, UnpatentableDrugs and the Standardsof Patentability,87 TEX. L. REV.

503, 511; Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Effective Patent Life in Pharmaceuticals, 19 INT'L
J. TECH. MGMT. 98, 109-17 (2000) (suggesting that the typical effective patent term is ten to twelve
years); Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods in
Pharmaceuticals,28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 491, 492 (2007) (finding that the "maximum
effective patent life" is typically fourteen years).
221. John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore & R. Derek Trunkey, Valuable
Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 452 (2004) (explaining that pharmaceutical drugs often have a valuable
market life that extends for many years after patenting).
222. Id. at 461 (contrasting drugs with electronic devices and other inventions, which often cease
to be useful or valuable relatively soon after patenting).
223. Id. at 455 (explaining the economics of the drug patent system).
224. Jonathan S. Masur & Adam K. Mortara, Patents, Property, and Prospectivity, 71 STAN. L.
REV. 963, 978 (2019) (describing, in the context of purely prospective changes in the law, how the ex
ante perspective is what matters for creating patent incentives).
225. Id. (explaining how ex post changes can affect ex ante incentives).
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strong reasons to believe that firms will satisfy both of these conditions.
There is extensive evidence that pharmaceutical firms do significant
research ahead of time to determine the potential market and likely effects
of their drugs. 226 This is especially true given that the majority of
pharmaceutical R&D expenses derive from the need to conduct clinical
trials to assess the safety and efficacy of the drugs. Firms cannot undertake
a clinical trial without knowing the potential market for their drug-after
all, those are the subjects of the clinical trial-and they are unlikely to
expend such resources without a strong sense of what effect the drug will
have on health and welfare, and thus how much market share it could
capture. In addition, there is even better evidence that the availability of
patents (and the patent term) affects pharmaceutical firms' decisionmaking.227
Our mechanism for creating incentives for firms to pursue welfareenhancing drugs is straightforward. Once a drug patent reaches the sixteenyear mark, the patent's owner may apply for an extension of the patent term
of up to five years. 228 We elected five years because it represents a
meaningful proportion of the typical ten-to-fourteen year effective life of a
drug patent.229 The PTO will grant or deny the extension on the basis of how
much the drug has improved welfare in the time it has been on the market.
We propose scaling term extensions to the number of QALYs that drugs
generate over alternative treatments. Drugs must increase overall welfare by
at least 100,000 QALYs to qualify for any term extension. We selected this
number because it represents a considerable increase in overall welfare, one
that only a few drugs achieve.23 0 In the study by Chambers and colleagues
that we described in the previous Part, only 14 of 102 drugs (13.7%) yielded
226. See generally Masur & Mortara, supra note 224 (describing the extent to which firms take
ex post effects into account ex ante).
227. Budish et al., supra note 27; Roin, supra note 220, at 545.
228. The idea of increasing or decreasing the patent term in accordance with the welfare benefit
of a patented drug was developed independently from and roughly contemporaneously with two
excellent papers by Neel U. Sukhatme and co-authors, though their papers were published before the
writing of this one was completed. See Son Le & Neel U. Sukhatme, Reaching for Mediocrity:

Competition and Stagnation in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 64 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 1 (2020); Sukhatme
& Bloche, supra note 78. Le, Sukhatme, and Bloche deserve credit for being the first (that we know of)
in writing to propose adjusting the patent term in accordance with a drug's welfare effects.
However, our paper expands considerably upon the idea proposed in those two papers and differs
from them in a number of critical ways. Among them: we describe in detail how to measure the welfare
effects of one drug as compared with another follow-on drug, a central issue that those papers do not
address; we explain why policymakers should focus on a patent's aggregate welfare effects, while
Sukhatme and Bloche seem to support per capita welfare effects; we advocate for the use of WBUs as
the proper measure of welfare; and we describe in detail how a system of patent term extensions (and
limitations) would function and address potential objections to it.
229. Roin, supra note 220, at 511. Of course, we are not wedded to this time period; policymakers
could certainly select a period of time that is shorter or longer.
230. Chambers et al., supra note 172, at 230.
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predicted welfare gains of at least 100,000 QALYS. 23' If the drug increases
overall welfare by at least 600,000 QALYs, it qualifies for a full five-year
term extension. Again, this number is chosen to reward only the very
highest-performing drugs. In Chambers' data, only a few drugs reach this
threshold. 23 2 Welfare increases between 100,000 QALYs and 600,000
QALYs will warrant proportionate term extensions of between 0 and 5
years. Thus, for instance, if a drug increases welfare by 350,000 QALYs
(halfway between 100,000 and 600,000 QALYS), it would qualify for a 2.5
year term extension. As we described above, ideally these welfare
improvements would be measured in WBUs, which are the best proxy for
actual changes in human welfare. 2 33 But until there is sufficient data to
denominate drug effects in WBUs, we advocate using QALYs as a secondbest option. 2 34
When measuring the welfare increase attributable to any particular drug,
our objective is to determine the counter-factual: how much has this drug
increased welfare, above and beyond what would have occurred if this drug
had never been invented or introduced? That is the proper baseline for
determining how important this drug was to overall welfare, and thus the
proper baseline for measuring whether this is the type of drug for which we
wish to create additional incentives. As we describe in greater detail below,
accurately measuring a drug's net effect requires a correct understanding of
the treatment options that both preceded and followed it.23 5
We draw our inspiration for this mechanism in part from the Orphan
Drug Act. 2 36 This law was designed to boost incentives for fins to develop
pharmaceutical drugs that treated relatively rare diseases and conditions.
The theory behind the Act is similar to the theory that underlies our paper:
if a disease is relatively rare, the market for a drug that treats the disease
may be too small to create the necessary incentives for a firm to develop
that drug. 237 Under the Orphan Drug Act, a firm that patents a drug that
treats a disease afflicting fewer than 200,000 people can apply for a sevenyear extension of market exclusivity through the FDA. 238 In theory, this

231.
232.

Id.
Id.

233.
234.

See supra notes 143-144.
See supra Part II (explaining the reasons to prefer WBUs over QALYs).

235.
236.

Infra Part III.B.
Pub. L. No. 97-414 (1983).

237. See generally David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of Innovation? At
What Cost?, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 125 (2000) (describing the intent and functioning of the Orphan
Drug Act).

238.

21 U.S.C.

§ 360cc(a).
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additional seven years of market exclusivity will provide the necessary
incentive to develop the drug in the first place. 2 39
But the Orphan Drug Act is an imperfect fit for the goal of increasing
human welfare, and its mis-design highlights the advantages of our contrary
approach. The fact that a disease afflicts fewer than 200,000 people might
be a reasonable proxy for whether additional incentives will be necessary to
induce a firm to produce the drug. 240 But it is not a good proxy for whether
the drug will increase welfare. If a disease afflicts fewer than 200,000
people, that is-if anything-an indication that a drug that treats that disease
may not have a substantial aggregate effect on welfare. The very fact of the
drug's narrowness is reason to worry that such a drug will not be as valuable
as alternatives that the firm might pursue.
Moreover, the Orphan Drug Act does nothing to address the principal
problem with the market for pharmaceutical drugs, which we described
above. 24 1 There are many widespread disease and conditions that
predominantly afflict poorer people who cannot pay large sums of money
for expensive medications.24 2 Drugs addressing these sorts of conditions
will be undersupplied by the market. But there is no reason to believe that
ability to pay for a drug will be correlated with whether the drug affects
200,000 people or fewer. Accordingly, it appears that the Orphan Drug Act
is used in at least some cases to extend the patent term of already-profitable
drugs that have only relatively small effects on welfare. 24 3 Needless to say,
this is not how a sensible law would be structured. 244
We envision the PTO adjudicating whether a drug patent owner is
entitled to a patent term extension in a trial-type proceeding before a board
at the Patent and Trademark Office. The drug owner carries the burden of
proof that the drug has in fact increased welfare and must present evidence
demonstrating this fact. At the same time, other parties-competitors of the
firm seeking the extension, generic manufacturers, the government, or
nongovernmental organizations-should be permitted to intervene in the
proceeding in opposition to the patent owner's claim and present evidence

239. Rohde, supra note 237, at 129-30 (explaining the incentives the Orphan Drug Act was
designed to create).

240.

Id. at 130.

&

241. See supra Part II.
242. See, e.g., TRACY KIDDER, MOUNTAINS BEYOND MOUNTAINS 126--27 (2004) (discussing the
prominence of TB and HIV in Haiti and other poor nations).
243. Jacquie Lee, Rare DiseaseDrugs Turning Huge Profits Catch Congress' Eye, BLOOMBERG
LAW (Jan. 28, 2020, 4:41 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/rare-diseasedrugs-turning-huge-profits-catch-congress-eye [https://perma.cc/E5CN-PVV5]; Kao-Ping Chua

Rena M. Conti, Policy Implications of the Orphan Drug Designationfor Remdesivir to Treat COVID19, 180 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1273, 1274 (2020) (explaining how FDA granted a seven-year extension
to Sublocade, a drug with $285 million in sales between 2002 and 2011).
244. we take up this issue further in Part IV.
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contradicting it. This proceeding will likely resemble Inter Partes Review,
the administrative procedure by which competitors and other parties can
challenge a patent before a panel of Patent Judges 24s In addition, a losing
party would have the option of appealing the PTO's decision to the Federal
Circuit, just as the losing party in an Inter Partes Review can appeal. 2 4 6
It is important for the question of a term extension to be resolved in
advance of the point at which a patent expires, in order to avoid the
inefficiency and confusion that would result if a patent expired, generics
entered the market, and then the patent was reinstated. In particular, the
process would ideally be complete in time for a generic manufacturer to file
for FDA approval in the event that the PTO denies the patent term
extension. 24 7 Accordingly, we propose measuring a drug's impact on
welfare at the sixteen-year mark in part because the process of application
and decision regarding a term extension could be lengthy. The typical Inter
Partes Review proceeding takes approximately eighteen months. 248 Inter
Partes Review cases that are appealed to the Federal Circuit usually take
approximately fifteen additional months to resolve. 249 Initiating the patent
term extension decision at the sixteen-year marks should mean that the
decision will be resolved at least one year in advance of the patent expiring.
Meanwhile, the FDA has instituted plans to approve generic drugs within
eight to ten months.250 All told, then, it should be possible to complete the
process for deciding whether to extend the patent term with enough time to
spare for generic manufacturers to enter the marketplace by the time the
patent expires.
B. The Choice of Baseline
As we noted above, the proper choice of baseline for measuring a drug's
impact on welfare is critical. The objective is to accurately construct the
245. The obvious difference is that in an Inter Partes Review proceeding, the party challenging
the patent bears the burden of persuasion, 37 C.F.R. § 42.20, whereas here the party seeking the patent
term extension would bear the burden of persuasion.

246.

35 U.S.C. § 141.

247. For a discussion of the approval process for generic drug entry, see Justina A. Molzon, The
Generic Drug Approval Process, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 275 (1995).

248.

Ryan Kenny, Which Invalidity Avenue to Take: Inter Partes Review Verses Post-Grant

Review, IP WATCHDOG (July 31, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/31/which-invalidity-ave
nue-ipr-verses-post-grant-review/id=99460 [https://perma.cc/EDJ2-UDUD]. By way of comparison, it
takes the PTO approximately two years to grant the average patent. Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO,

65 DUKE L.J. 1701, 1731 (2016).
249. Kerry Taylor, Daniel Kamkar & Joel Broussard, IPR Appeals in 2017: The Pendency and
Success Rates, LAw360 (Jan. 16, 2018, 1:39 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1000442/ipr-appeal
s-in-2017-the-pendency-and-success-rates.
250. Zachary Brennan, GDUFA II: FDA Looks to Speed Up Generic Drug Approval Process,
REGUL. FocUs (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.raps.org/regulatory-focus%E2%84%A2/news-articles/20

16/9/gdufa-ii-fda-looks-to-speed-up-generic-drug-approval-process.
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counter-factual question: How much did this particular drug increase human
welfare, compared with a world in which it never came into existence? If
the baseline is chosen incorrectly, it may lead the PTO to grant term
extensions where they are unwarranted or deny them where they would be
appropriate.
We begin with the simplest case. Imagine a disease that kills 1,000
people annually. Firm A introduces a drug to treat this disease. Of the 1,000
people who contract the disease each year, 500 of them take the drug, and
300 of them have their lives saved by the drug. The other 700 people do not
experience any changes in their lives before they die from the disease. The
drug is on the market for ten years when its patent reaches the sixteen-year
mark, meaning that it saves the lives of 3,000 people. On average, the people
whose lives are saved by the drug go on to live an additional forty years at
an average HRQoL (health-related quality of life per year) of 0.7. The
welfare benefit of the drug, measured against the baseline in which the drug
does not exist, is given by the following equation:
W=nxLxH
in which W is the total welfare benefit (QALYs), n is the number of people
who benefit from having taken the drug, L is the number of extra years of
life preserved, and H is the welfare benefit per year of life (in HRQoL, or
QALYs per year per person). Plugging in our values:
W = 3,000 people x 40 years per person x 0.7 HRQoL
W = 84,000 QALYs
We would perform the same calculation for a drug that improves lives,
rather than saving them, simply by looking at the same variables in a
different way. For instance, imagine that this disease is not fatal, but it
reduces the well-being of any person afflicted with it by 0.25 QALYs per
year for a period of five years. The drug prevents this reduction in 300 of
the 500 people who take it each year (for each of ten years, meaning it
successfully treats 3,000 people). The overall welfare benefit of the drug is
given by same equation:
W=nxLxH
in which W is still the total welfare benefit and n is still the number of
people who benefit from having taken the drug, but L is the number of years
the disease would have persisted and H is the welfare loss avoided per
person per year. Plugging in our values:
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W = 3,000 people x 5 years per person x 0.25 HRQoL
W = 3,750 QALYs
These equations are aimed at determining the same quantity: the
difference in QALYs earned per year between a person taking and not
taking the drug. That is, the total welfare benefit is more precisely given by
the following final equation:
-

H2

)

W = n x L x (H 1

)

in which W is still the total welfare benefit (QALYs) and n is still the
number of people who benefit from having taken the drug, but L is the
amount of years affected by taking the drug, H 1is the QALYs earned per
person per year by those who took the drug, and H2 is the QALYs earned
per person per year had they not taken the drug. In other words, (H 1 - H 2
is the well-being improvement to each person whose life is improved by the
drug-note that it is possible that someone might take the drug but not
improve. Plugging in our values:
Example 1: W = 3,000 x 40 x (0.7 - 0.0) = 84,000 QALYs
Example 2: W = 3,000 x 5 x (0.7 - 0.45) = 3,750 QALYs
If a drug combined both of these effects-preventing both mortality and
morbidity-the welfare effects of the reductions in mortality and morbidity
would obviously be combined.
Of course, it is rarely the case that a given disease can only be treated by
one drug, the drug in question.2 5' Much more commonly there are two or
more drugs that can be used to treat a given disease, each of them with
slightly varying effects.252 Indeed, this issue of "me too" drugs-drugs that
are introduced as slightly different versions of existing medications-is one
of the central animating concerns of this Article.2 5 3 In the typical "me too"
drug scenario, a first drug is developed that treats a significant condition.
This drug produces large revenues, which then induces subsequent drug
manufacturers to produce similar drugs-perhaps slightly superior but
perhaps not-in an attempt to win some of the market share away from the
original producer.25 4 In some cases, the second drug is able to capture only
a relatively small fraction of the first drug's market share; in other cases, it
is able to capture almost all of the first drug's market share. In addition, the
introduction of a second drug could lower the prices that both firms charge
251.
252.

Hollis, supra note 44, at 5.
Id.

253.
254.

Gagne & Choudhry, supra note 86, at 711.
Hollis, supra note 44, at 5; Gagne & Choudhry, supra note 86, at 711.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1440

[VOL. 98:1403

for their various drugs; duopoly pricing is typically lower than monopoly
pricing,"' although as we showed in Part II, the evidence of this effect on
drug consumption is mixed. 256 Nonetheless, competition could have the
salutary effect of increasing the number of people who are able to afford
one of the two drugs.25 7
The question is how to judge the welfare impacts of Drugs 1 and 2, given
the fact that both of them exist and compete for the same market. First,
consider Drug 2. The proper baseline for judging Drug 2 is not a
hypothetical world in which Drug 1 does not exist. After all, Drug 1 did
exist when Drug 2 was developed and first hit the market. Drug 2 only
deserves credit for the marginal welfare gains produced by its introduction
into the market, above and beyond the welfare gains that Drug 1 was already
producing. 258 Drug 2 might generate some welfare gains simply because it
is better than Drug 1. In addition, Drug 2 might also generate welfare gains
because its introduction lowers the cost of both drugs and enables more
people to afford them. Put another way, if the introduction of Drug 2 causes
an additional person to be able to take either Drug 1 or Drug 2, then Drug 2
deserves credit for that gain in welfare. But if the introduction of Drug 2
induces someone to switch from Drug 1 to Drug 2, Drug 2 only deserves
credit for the marginal gain in welfare that the person receives from taking
Drug 2 instead of Drug 1. This can be expressed with the following series
of equations:
Starting with Equation 1:
Total welfare gain from Drug 2 = marginal welfare gain from patients
who switched from Drug 1 to Drug 2
+ total welfare gain from new Drug 2 patients
+ total welfare gain from new Drug 1 Patients
or
W = (WMarginal) +

(WDrug

2 new)

+ (WDrug

1 new)

255. Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities, 54 REV.
ECON. STUD. 23, 26 (1987) (showing that pricing will generally be lower and quantity will be greater
under a duopoly than a monopoly).
256. See supra notes 207-213 and accompanying text.

257.

Gagne & Choudhry, supra note 86, at 711.

258. This is one of the limitations of the data produced by Chambers and colleagues that was
discussed in Part n. They had to rely on existing studies that compared pharmaceuticals to alternative
treatments. Often, several drugs that came out over a period of years were compared to the same baseline
treatment rather than to the drugs that had reestablished the new baseline. Chambers et al., supra note

172, at 230.
We anticipate that the patent extension trials conducted by the PTO can improve this process. The
added time period may help with baseline comparisons, and firms and other organizations should be
incentivized to both produce and challenge data.
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where W is total welfare gain from introducing Drug 2 to the market,
WMarginal is the total marginal welfare gain from patients who switched
from Drug 1 to Drug 2, and WDrug 1 new and WDrug 2 new are the total
welfare gains from new patients-"new" meaning patients not previously
taking Drug 1 prior to the introduction of Drug 2-taking Drugs 1 and 2.
Expanding these terms yields Equation 2:
W
[(welfare gain from Drug 2 per person
- welfare gain from Drug 1 per person)
x number of patients who switched from Drug 1 to Drug 2]
+ (Drug 2 welfare gain per patient x number of new Drug 2 patients)
+ (Drug 1 welfare gain per patient x number of new Drug 1 patients)
=

or
W =

[(HDrug

2 -

HDrug 1) x nswitch] + (HDrug 2 x

+ (HDrug

1

nDrug 2 new)

x nDrug 1 new)

where HDrug 1 and HDrug 2 are the welfare gains per patient taking Drugs 1
and 2, nDrug 1 new and nDrug 2 new are the number of new patients taking
Drugs 1 and 2, and nswitch is the number of patients who switched from
Drug 1 to Drug 2.
Regrouping these terms yields Equation 3:
W
(welfare gain for each Drug 2 patient x number of Drug 2 patients)
- [Drug 1 welfare gain per patient
x (number of Drug 1 patients before Drug 2 is introduced
- number of Drug 1patients after Drug 2 is introduced)]
=

or
W = (HDrug 2 x nDrug 2) -

[HDrug 1(fDrug 1 before Drug 2

-

nDrug 1)]

where nDrug 1 and nDrug 2 are the number of patients taking Drugs 1 and 2
after Drug 2 was introduced, and nDrug 1before Drug 2 is the number of
patients who were taking Drug 1 prior to the introduction of Drug 2.
The first term on the right-hand side of this equation is the total welfare
gain of all people taking Drug 2. The second term represents all of the
people who have switched away from Drug 1 as a result of the introduction
of Drug 2. This second term is subtracted from the first to represent the fact
that Drug 2 deserves credit only for the marginal gains to these individuals
from the switch.
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Consider a numerical example. Suppose that a disease afflicts 1,000
people and causes them to lose 0.3 QALYs annually. Drug 1 is introduced,
500 people begin taking Drug 1, and each of those people sees an increase
in their welfare of 0.2 QALYs each year. Subsequently, Drug 2 is
introduced. Drug 2 improves the welfare of someone afflicted with Disease
by 0.3 QALYs, which is slightly better than Drug 1. 300 of the 500 people
taking Drug 1 switch to Drug 2. In addition, this forces both Drug 1 and
Drug 2 to lower their prices, such that 50 additional people start taking Drug
1 and 100 additional people start taking Drug 2. Now there are 400 people
taking Drug 2 and 250 people taking Drug 1. In total, after the introduction
of Drug 2, Drug 2 is producing 120 QALYs in yearly welfare gains and
Drug 1 is producing 50 QALYs in welfare gains for a total of 170 QALYs
in yearly welfare gains. However, the welfare gain attributable to Drug 2 is
only:
W = (HDrug 2 X nDrug 2) -

[HDrug

1(nDrug 1

before Drug 2

-

nDrug 1

W = (0.3 QALYs per person x 400 people)
- [0.2 QALYs per person (500 people - 250 people)]
Drug 2 total welfare gain = 120 QALYs - 50 QALYs = 70 QALYs
Or, put another way, Drug 2 gets credit for 0.1 QALYs for each of the 300
people who switched over (30 QALYs total), plus 0.3 QALYs for each of
the 100 new people who started taking Drug 2 (30 QALYs), plus 0.2
QALYs for each of the 50 new people who started taking Drug 1 because
of the introduction of Drug 2 (10 QALYs) for a total of 70 QALYs. Drug 1
is credited with the remaining 170 QALYs - 70 QALYs = 100 QALYs of
welfare gain, which is the equivalent welfare gain it was producing before
Drug 2 was introduced.
The upshot is that with the appropriate choice of baseline, truly
groundbreaking drugs that yield significant welfare gains are awarded
greater credit toward patent extensions, while "me too" drugs that yield only
marginal gains are awarded less credit. Here, Drug 2-the better drug-is
able to capture much of the market and is thus producing greater welfare
gains than Drug 1. But the fact remains that Drug 2 is only a minor
improvement on Drug 1, and it was the original introduction of Drug 1 that
generated the greatest overall welfare gains. Accordingly, Drug 1 would
receive greater credit toward a patent term extension. It is socially beneficial
for pharmaceutical firms to spend more resources pursuing drugs like Drug
1 and fewer resources pursuing drugs like Drug 2.
This type of calculation can be repeated recursively for any number of
drugs that treat the same condition. The principle underlying it remains
consistent: the greatest rewards should go to the patented drugs that make
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the greatest impact on welfare, measured against the status quo ante before
the drug was developed. Following a successful drug with a slightly more
effective treatment for the same condition, and thus exploiting the market
structure of pharmaceutical drugs, is precisely the sort of behavior we hope
to disincentivize.
C. FutilityPatents
We have thus far been describing the incentive mechanisms we envision
being deployed to spur creation of welfare enhancing drugs and medical
treatments. But there is no reason that these mechanisms need be one-sided.
That is, we can do more to spur welfare enhancing drugs than increasing
patent incentives for successful drugs. We can also create disincentives for
firms to produce and patent drugs or treatments that have small or negative
effects on overall welfare-"me too" drugs and the other sorts of treatments
we described in Part II. Here, too, a drug's effect on welfare would be
measured against the baseline of a counterfactual world in which the drug
had never been created. Thus, follow-on innovations that represent only
mild improvements over pre-existing drugs and treatments (but subsume
significant market share) would be understood to have produced only
meager welfare gains. 25 9
In parallel to the process we described for extending a patent term, we
propose that any party be permitted to initiate a proceeding in the PTO to
have a patent adjudged as a "futility patent" as early as the patent's twelfth
year of existence. At this proceeding, all interested parties--competitors,
insurance companies, or public interest organizations--could intervene to
present evidence of the patent's negative or relatively small impact on
overall welfare, and the patent owner could present contrary evidence. We
expect that this process and any accompanying appeal to the Federal Circuit
would take no more than three years to complete. If the patent were
challenged in its twelfth year and classified as "futile," whatever
disadvantages might apply to it would begin no later than the patent's
fifteenth year. The reason for beginning the process this early is that
penalties for futile patents will only be successful and only worth pursuing
if they arise sufficiently in advance of the end of the effective patent term.
The penalty for a futility patent should vary depending on whether the
patent has a small beneficial effect on overall welfare or whether it creates
zero or negative welfare. With regard to patents that generate zero or
negative welfare effects-patents that are no better, or even worse, than
what preceded them-we recommend putting teeth in the patent law's

259.

Chambers et al., supra note 165, at 1755.
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utility requirement. 260 As we explained in Part I, the requirement that a
patent be "useful" has heretofore been interpreted to impose only a very
minimal barrier to patenting. 261 It weeds out inventions for which there is
no known use, but little more than that.2 62 But there is no reason that it
should be so limited, and as we have explained there are good reasons to
eliminate and discourage patents that make no meaningful welfare
contribution. 2 63 Accordingly, we propose that Congress enact a law
instructing the PTO to invalidate any patent that has produced zero or
negative social welfare by the time it is challenged in a "futility" hearing.
This change would give real meaning to the patent law's ostensible
requirement that patents be useful. And it would dramatically diminish the
incentives for firms to invent drugs that merely duplicate, or are even
inferior to, the drugs that preceded them. Where the market for
pharmaceuticals creates distortions, patent law can help to smooth them out.
For patents on drugs that are creating only small gains to welfare, we
would not recommend as drastic a remedy as cancellation. Instead, we
would ideally apply a penalty that is symmetric to the enhanced rewards
described above for welfare-enhancing drugs: the patent terms of those
drugs should be reduced when the drug falls short of a pre-determined
welfare threshold. Unfortunately, however, there is a complication that
makes administering a penalty of that type effectively impossible. Congress
can increase patent terms by statute, and it has already done so a number of
times,264 but it cannot reduce patent terms below twenty years without
running afoul of the United States' commitments under the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 265 TRIPS
establishes various floors for intellectual property rights among signatory
countries, and one of those floors is a minimum term of twenty years for
utility patents. 2 66 A mechanism to disincentivize the creation of these types
of drugs must therefore rely on other policy levers. 2 67
260.

35 U.S.C. § 101.

261. Risch, supra note 52, at 1200-06; Robin Feldman, The Cancer Curse: Regulatory Failure
by Success, 21 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 1 (2019).
262. See supra Part I.
263. See supra notes 37-40 (discussing the administrative, search, and design-around costs of
useless patents).

264. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983); Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
265. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 33, Apr. 15, 1994
("The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of twenty years counted
from the filing date.").

266.

Id. Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 151, 152 n.6 (1999)

(discussing the TRIPS requirement of twenty years of patent protection).
267. In addition, although patent owners will generally have sufficient incentives to generate data
about the effectiveness of their products, other parties may not. Kapczynski, supra note 44, at 2365. The
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Despite this hurdle, there are a wide variety of penalty options for
policymakers to choose from. Even without directly invalidating less
worthwhile patents or reducing their terms, Congress or the PTO could, by
statute or rule, weaken these types of patents and encourage challenges to
them-thus reducing their overall value. Perhaps most obviously, the fact
that a patent produces negligible or negative welfare benefits should make
it ineligible for a term extension under the Hatch-Waxman Act 2 68 or the
Orphan Drug Act. 269 Hatch-Waxman extensions compensate patent holders
for the time that their drugs spend in FDA clinical trials, lengthening their
formal patent terms in order to produce effective exclusivity periods that are
closer to twenty years. 270 Although FDA review can help establish whether
the pharmaceutical is minimally safe and effective, as we explained above,
FDA approval is poorly correlated with actual welfare benefits. 271 By the
time the patent holder applies for a Hatch-Waxman extension, however, it
is possible to know how well the drug actually works. If the answer is "not
very well," there is no reason to provide an extension. The same is true for
drugs that receive extensions under the Orphan Drug Act. By definition,
drugs that are eligible for this extension treat small populations, so they are
less likely, all else equal, to generate significant aggregate welfare
benefits. 272 And as scholars have shown, pharmaceutical companies may be
manipulating the law to receive added protection for blockbuster high-profit
drugs. 273 Term extensions in such cases are unwarranted.
Additional policy levers abound. Congress could pass a law removing
the presumption of validity from futility patents. 274 This would allow any
party challenging the patent in court to prove that the patent is invalid only
by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by the higher "clear and
costs of obtaining well-being data are higher for other parties than they are for patent owners, and the
benefits that can be obtained from those data will be spread among many parties, undermining their
potential value to any particular party. Kapczynski & Syed, supra note 5, at 1927. This may reduce the
rate at which competitors decide to challenge existing patents as futile, because to do so would mean
that a firm would effectively be producing a public good. It is for this reason that we suggest that the
government and public interest groups be permitted to bring similar challenges.
268. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). This law, colloquially known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, permits
patent owners to apply for patent term extensions when the FDA took a longer time to approve the
underlying drug.

269. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
270. See Brian P. Wallenfelt, Hatch-Waxman and Medical Devices, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1407, 1418 (2014); see also Erika Lietzan, The History and Political Economy of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 53, 65 (2018).
271.

See supraPart II.B.

272. See Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of Intellectual
Property, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1384-85 (2011).
273.

Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE

J. HEALTH

POL'Y L. & ETHICS

717, 726 n.39 (2005) (citing Taxol and AZT as blockbuster drugs approved under the Orphan Drug Act).
274. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
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convincing evidence" standard. 27 The PTO could waive the Inter Partes
Review filing fee, which currently stands at $15,500, for challenges to
futility patents. 276 This would make it less expensive for any third party to
challenge the patent before the PTO and have it judged invalid. Congress
(or the courts) could also declare that any case in which the owner of such

a patent loses is per se an "exceptional case" for purposes of attorneys' fee-

shifting. 2 77 That would place the owner of such a patent on notice that if it
asserted the patent and lost, it would necessarily have to pay the attorneys'
fees of the party it had sued. In turn, patent owners would be much less
willing to threaten dubious lawsuits, including nuisance suits, for fear that
they will lose and end up holding the bag. 278 Congress could also eliminate
the possibility of receiving treble damages for willful infringement in a suit
based on such a patent, 279 or Congress could even eliminate the possibility
of asking for reasonable royalty damages and force the patent-owner to
prove that it has lost profits. 280 This is a small sampling of the potential
options, and one that largely focuses on the monetary costs and benefits of
asserting a patent; one could imagine a wide variety of other approaches as
well. 281
We envision the Futility Patent process resembling the process of Inter
Partes Review (and the process for adjudicating patent term extensions).
Any interested party could pay a fee, initiate a Futility Patent proceeding,
and attempt to prove that a patented invention is generating few or zero
welfare gains. The list of potential filers includes competitors or generic
manufacturers who seek to weaken a competitor's patent; insurance
companies, who would benefit from seeing a drug patent expire sooner
(leading to price reductions); public-interest organizations with an interest

275.

Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011) (setting forth the "clear and

convincing" standard).

276.
277.

37 C.F.R. § 42.15(a).
35 U.S.C. § 285; Octane Fitness, L.L.C. v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545-(2014).

278. See Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J.
637 (2013) (describing how loser-pays systems can deter weaker patent cases by raising the costs to the
losing party that asserts a weak patent).

279.

35 U.S.C. § 284.

280. Id.; see generally Mark A. Lemley, DistinguishingLost Profitsfrom Reasonable Royalties,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655 (2009) (explaining the differences between these two theories of damages,
the advantages and disadvantages of each, and the manner in which plaintiffs might try to prove their
theories of damages).
281. For instance, Congress could directly adjust the legal standards that apply to such patents. It
could weaken the threshold for finding such a patent anticipated or obvious under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and
103, or it could heighten the enablement or written description requirements for these types of patents
under 35 U.S.C. § 112. These tools would require careful crafting, and they are not as straightforward
to implement as the presumption- and fee-shifting approaches described above. The point is merely to
illustrate the range of options available to policymakers.
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in cheaper drug prices for consumers;282 or even the government, if it
believes that a firm is creating social waste via its patents. The party that
initiates a Futility Patent proceeding is creating a public good by reducing
the patent term in a way that will redound to the benefit of many people. So
it is important not to dissuade potential filers. On the other hand, it is also
important to avoid nuisance filings meant only to harass the patent owner.
Accordingly, we envision requiring a significant filing fee on the order of
$50,000, similar to the fee that accompanies the filing of an Inter Partes
Review. But the fee could be refundable (or payable by the patent holder)
in the event the challenger prevails.
In addition, challengers could receive a type of bounty akin to the
mechanism in the Hatch-Waxman Act-whether in the form of a cash
payment or a period of regulatory exclusivity-if they prevail. 283 And if
necessary to deter frivolous suits, challengers could be forced to pay patent
owner's costs in the event that the patent is not adjudged futile.28 4 It is
beyond the scope of this paper to fill in every last detail of how Futility
Patent challenges would operate. 285 The point is that such a system would
be effective and workable, particularly given the extent to which it
resembles existing patent processes.
We will illustrate the functioning of this mechanism with an example.
Suppose that Pharma Firm creates Drug B, a "me too" drug that largely
duplicates the effect of existing medication. (The existing medication might
even be one of Pharma Firm's previous drugs.) The Coalition for Affordable
Prescription Drugs ("The Coalition") 286 observes the limited effect of Drug
B and initiates a "futility" proceeding against it before the PTO. The
Coalition, aided by data provided by insurance companies and the FDA,
succeeds in proving to the PTO that Drug B is futile-it has at best a very
marginal effect on welfare. Pharma Firm appeals to the Federal Circuit,
which affirms the PTO's decision. Just as the patent on Drug B is entering
its sixteenth year, then, all of the penalties of futility attach to Drug B.
Pharma Firm cannot apply for an extension of its period of exclusivity under

282. One of the most famous Supreme Court patent cases of recent vintage was filed by a public
interest organization seeking to invalidate DNA patents. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad

Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
283.

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L.

No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
284. These types of loser-pays agreements are useful at providing incentives to bring meritorious
lawsuits and not to bring non-meritorious lawsuits. See Malani & Masur, supra note 278 (describing
how loser-pays systems can deter weaker patent cases by raising the costs to the losing party that asserts
a weak patent); Neel U. Sukhatme, "Loser Pays" in PatentExamination, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 165 (2016).
285. The PTO could flesh out such details through rulemaking, as it did with Inter Partes Review.
Masur, supra note 248.
286. See generally COALITION FOR AFFORDABLE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, https://www.affordablep
rescriptiondrugs.org/ [https://perma.cc/7EQM-2MZ5].
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the Hatch-Waxman Act2 87 or the Orphan Drug Act. 288 In addition, if Pharma
Firm sues any party for infringing its patent on Drug B, the patent will not
be presumed valid in litigation. And if Pharma Firm loses the infringement
litigation, it will have to pay the attorneys' fees stemming from the
litigation. 289 This, in turn, will invite generic manufacturers to enter the
marketplace and challenge Drug B. Those challenges will be both easier to
win and cheaper for the challengers. All of this will make Drug B
substantially less valuable to Pharma Firm and, we hope, convince Pharma
Firm and its similarly situated competitors not to pursue such drugs in the
future.
To be clear, our goal is explicitly not to punish pharmaceutical
companies for drug innovations that turn out not to work well. Instead, our
objective is to minimize the expected returns, either from the market or from
litigation, for low or negative welfare patent holders. This, in turn, will alter
the incentive structure for pursuing different sorts of treatments. Because
firms will know that their "me too" drugs may not receive term extensions,
they will have less reason to invest in developing them and should instead
invest in innovations with more promising welfare benefits. The
mechanisms we describe here would not decimate a patent's value; even if
some number of encumbrances were attached, the patent would still retain
value if used properly. But since the effective exclusivity period for
pharmaceutical patents is already well below twenty years,290 reductions in
the value of the last five years of the patent term should markedly reduce
the incentives for firms to pursue these types of patents in the first place.
D. Harnessingthe Power of Markets
We are certainly not the first scholars to propose mechanisms for solving
the problems with the pharmaceutical industry's incentives. 29 1 And we do
not mean to suggest that any of these other solutions is inferior to ours.
Nonetheless, we wish to point out several strengths that our proposed
amendments to patent duration have over other options. In particular, our

287.

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-waxman) Act of 1984, Pub.

Law 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
288. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983).
289. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (providing for payment of attorneys' fees by the losing party in
exceptional cases).
290. Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 220, at 103-05 (finding that the effective exclusivity period
for pharmaceutical drugs is less than 20 years, and more like 10-15 years in most cases).
291. AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES
ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL (2008); Carl Nathan, Aligning PharmaceuticalInnovation with Medical Need, 13
NATURE MED. 304 (2007); Grootendorst, supra note 199, at 316-17; Xue & Oullette, supra note 95;
Sukhatme & Bloche, supra note 16, at 976.
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proposal harnesses the power of markets to help discipline pharmaceutical
companies.
In a number of European countries, governmental bodies engage in
health technology assessments (HTA) that evaluate the cost effectiveness of
treatment options and make recommendations about whether they should be
paid for by national health systems. 2 92 These offices consider the estimated
number of QALYs that a treatment will create relative to the treatment's
cost.293 Only if the treatment meets a certain threshold (e.g., no more than
E50,000/QALY) will it be approved for payment. We believe that the
United States should also adopt an office of health technology assessment
to provide valuable data to patients, physicians, insurers, and drug
companies about treatment options. But our proposal would still be valuable
even with such an agency. First, European HTA agencies tend to ignore
aggregate welfare in favor of welfare per person. That might be a reasonable
choice for an insurer to make ex post between two existing treatment
options, but, as we explained above, it does not adequately align incentives
ex ante.294 Because the patent system's principal goal is to maximize social
welfare, it should be encouraging the production of drugs that generate the
greatest net effects. 2 95
Second, by restricting access to the market for some treatments, HTA
offices may eliminate the salutary effects of price competition. With fewer
drugs approved to treat a condition, those that make the cut could reap even
greater profits. 296 Rather than having the FDA or an HTA make robust costeffectiveness decisions early in a drug's lifetime, our proposal allows the
PTO to determine the strength of patent law's incentives after the drug has
been on the market for a while. And because our proposal is based on
aggregate welfare rather than per-person welfare, pharmaceutical
companies will be motivated to increase the number of people taking their
drugs. One way they can do this is to reduce prices.
Return to the scenario above where Drug 1 creates considerable
improvement in treatment outcomes relative to the status quo but is quickly

292. Sorenson & Chalkidou, supra note 114, at 29-30 (describing the scope of health technology
assessment offices across Europe).

293. Li Huang, Paul Frijters, Kim Dalziel & Philip Clarke, Life Satisfaction, QALYs, and the
Monetary Value of Health, 211 Soc. SCI. & MED. 131 (2018).
294. When insurers decide whether to approve a drug for treatment of a condition, the question
they face is largely one of per-person value. Given a certain number of people with a disease, what is
the most cost effective way of treating it? But the patent system addresses a different question. How can
the law establish incentives that encourage private actors to address diseases where there are the biggest
potential gains to human welfare?
295. See supra notes 26-35.
296. Note that many European countries have other mechanisms in place to control the prices that
pharmaceutical companies can charge. Absent those controls in the US, we could see even higher prices
if the FDA restricted approvals.

1450

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 98:1403

followed by Drug 2, which yields slightly better results. Under the current
regime, the duopoly may reach an equilibrium in which both drugs charge
high prices, splitting the market in half 297 Neither one wants to start a price
war, especially if the pharmaceutical fins may also be competing with each
other on other drugs. Under our approach, however, either firm could obtain
a substantial increase in its patent term-and, thus, its potential profit-by
dropping its price to capture a greater share of the market.
Importantly, our proposal does not just influence the ex ante incentives
that pharmaceutical firms have to produce high value drugs, it also
influences their behavior once their drugs enter the market. Should a firm
find itself in a position where it has created a "me too" drug unintentionally,
it won't be barred from the market. And more importantly, it will have
stronger incentives to reduce the drug's price either to qualify for a patent
term extension 298 or to stave off challenges and penalties. 2 99
Finally, our proposal gives the manufacturer additional incentives to
obtain FDA approval for new uses of existing therapies. 300 Although the
FDA approves drugs for marketing based on their treatment of particular
diseases, physicians can prescribe the drugs for so-called "off-label" uses.301
For example, although clonidine is approved only for treatment of
hypertension, it is often prescribed for people suffering from ADHD, cancer
pain, nicotine dependence, and restless leg syndrome. 3 02 While some offlabel uses are supported by scientific data, most lack evidence of therapeutic
value. 303 The FDA does not have the authority to prevent this practice, and
manufacturers may secretly encourage off-label uses of their drugs. 304 But
firms have little reason to seek formal FDA approval for new indications of
their drugs, because doing so is expensive and could reveal damaging
information about the drug's effects. 30 5 Our proposal could address this
concern by only counting the welfare benefits that arise from FDAapproved uses. If a firm wants credit for treating other disorders for
purposes of obtaining a patent term extension, it would need to seek FDA

297. See wineinger, Zhang & Topol, supranote 77, at 6 (noting the high correlation between the
prices of competitor drugs).

298.

See supra Part IILA.

299.
300.

See supra Part ll.C.
Eisenberg, supra note 273, at 717.

301.
(2008).

Dominique Leveque, Off-Label Use of Anticancer Drugs, 9 LANCET ONCOLOGY 1102

302. Timothy O'Shea, 10 Surprising Off-Label Uses for PrescriptionMedications, PHARMACY
TIMES (Jan. 5,2016,9:01 AM), https://www.pharmacytimes.com/contributor/timothy-o-shea/2016/01/1
0-surprising-off-label-uses-for-prescription-medications [https://perma.cc/2HYZ-X2Q4].

303. David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein & Randall S. Stafford, Off-Label PrescribingAmong
Office-BasedPhysicians, 166 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1023 (2006).
304.

Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 273, at 733.

305.

Id. at 725.
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approval for them. In order to do so, it would need to conduct new clinical
trials and generate new valuable data about safety and effectiveness.

We have outlined a new system for properly calibrating patent law's
incentives to a drug's therapeutic value. The owners of patents on drugs that
greatly improved human welfare would have the capacity to apply for patent
term extensions of up to five years, as an additional reward for the drug's
beneficial impact. Conversely, drugs that have minimal or negative impacts
on welfare could be challenged in "futility" proceedings, where the power
of their patents could be reduced. In combination, the possibility of carrots
for patents with large effects on welfare and sticks for patents with small
effects should orient pharmaceutical firms' R&D priorities toward the drugs
that will produce the greatest welfare effects-precisely what would be best
for society, and what the patent system is intended to accomplish. Moreover,
those incentives carry over to the time when drugs are being marketed in
ways that can have salutary effects on prices and on data. Although much
remains to be filled in, our proposal, along with the data that we cite in Part
II, offers a proof of concept that scholars and policymakers can begin to use.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

We anticipate that our proposal will meet with objections from some
scholars. In this Part, we address some of the potential objections we
anticipate. We also offer some further considerations about the future of
medical technology.
A. Additional Rewardsfor Successful Drugs?
We suspect some scholars will be concerned that our proposal would
lead to additional rewards for drugs that are already successful on the
market-drugs for which no additional reward is necessary. 306 In some
cases, this is indeed what would occur. If a firm invents a drug that treats a
very serious condition-meaning that it has a significant effect on welfarethat afflicts a large number of people, and it is able to sell the drug at a
meaningful price, then the drug will be both commercially successful and
will qualify for a patent term extension under our framework.
306. Richard Posner, Pharmaceutical Patents, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG (Dec. 12, 2004), https:
//www.becker-posner-blog.com/2004/12/pharmaceutical-patents--posner.html [https://perma.cc/GY8K
-FYXWI ("The entire patent prize goes to the firm that crosses the finish line first, and so a firm might
spend a huge amount of money to beat its nearest rival by one day even though the value to the public
of having the invention one day earlier might be negligible."); see also Robin Feldman, May Your Drug
Price Be Evergreen, 5 J.L. & Bioscis. 590 (2018).
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Nonetheless, we believe that we should be willing to tolerate this
possibility. The reason is that, in a world of finite drug development
investment, the question is not merely whether a particular drug is profitable
or not; the question is how the profitability of one drug compares to the
profitability of the foregone alternatives. 307 Our animating concern is that a
firm might elect to pursue a highly profitable drug that targets only a small
number of wealthy individuals 3 08 instead of a slightly less profitable drug
that would target a broader number of less wealthy individuals but produce
greater welfare gains. 309 Under these circumstances, a potential patent term
extension for the broader-but still profitable-drug constitutes a feature of
the system, not a bug. Our goal is to increase the likelihood that firms will
choose that drug over the alternative.
In addition, our mechanism is self-regulating when it comes to the price
and availability of a drug. Suppose a pharmaceutical firm invents a new
blockbuster drug that is very successful in treating a serious disease. If the
firm raises the price of that drug significantly, such that only the wealthiest
patients can afford the drug, that will affect the drug's overall impact on
welfare. Even if the drug is saving or dramatically improving the lives of
the people who take it, it will not have a great impact on overall welfare if
only a few people can afford it. This is part of the reason why we propose
basing patent term extensions on a drug's overall impact on welfare, rather
than (for instance) the welfare increase per person who takes the drug. 310
Using the overall welfare impact as the operative metric forces
pharmaceutical firms to price their drugs at a level that makes them
accessible to the patient population if they want to obtain a term extension.
Accordingly, as we explained above, our mechanism creates incentives not
merely for drug development but also for drug distribution and uptake. This
is in contrast to the Orphan Drug Act, which can lead to term extensions
even for drugs with incredibly high prices that help relatively few people. 3
Two caveats are in order. First is the potential concern that a firm might
hold down the price of its drug until Year 18 in order to qualify for a patent

307.

Id. at 596-97.

308. See Sarah Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugs for Rare Diseases Have Become
Uncommonly Rich Monopolies, NPR (Jan. 17,2017,4:59 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-sho
ts/2017/01/17/509506836/drugs-for-rare-diseases-have-become-uncommonly-rich-monopolies [https://
perma.cc/G4HB-UUTB]; see also Koichi Mikami, Orphans in the Market: The History of OrphanDrug

Policy, 32 SOc. HIST. MED. 609, 628 (2017).
309. See, e.g., Zulfiqar A. Bhutta, Johannes Sommerfeld, Zohra S. Lassi, Rehana A. Salam & Jai
K. Das, GlobalBurden, Distribution,and Interventionsfor Infectious Diseasesof Poverty, 3 INFECTIOUS
DISEASES POVERTY 21 (2014).
310. See supra Part II.D.
311. Jacquie Lee, Rare DiseaseDrugs Turning Huge Profits Catch Congress'Eye, BLOOMBERG
L. (Jan. 28, 2020, 5:41 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/rare-disease-dru
gs-turning-huge-profits-catch-congress-eye [https://perma.cc/C74Z-MCNE].
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term extension, and then raise the price of the drug after the extension has
been granted. We believe that such a practice should be prohibited. As a
condition of receiving a patent term extension, the firm owning the patent
should be required to aver that it will price the drug no higher it was priced
before the extension was granted. The term extension should be revoked if
the firm deviates from this agreement. Second, we do not mean to imply
that the mechanism we describe in this Article is first-best, or that it is
perfect and cannot be improved upon. One could imagine superior-and
more complicated-alternatives in which a drug would qualify for a term
extension if and only if it had sufficiently low profits, in addition to
sufficiently great welfare effects. We do not mean to disclaim the possibility
or value of such options.
Finally, what the law gives, it also takes away. Alongside additional
rewards for welfare-enhancing drugs, we proposed reductions in the
effective term, power, and value of patents that produce only negative or
negligible therapeutic effects. The overall effect on the patent system, then,
is indeterminate. It is possible that our mechanisms would make drug
patents more powerful and valuable on the whole; it is also possible that
they would be weakened overall. The one thing we can know for sure is that
they would generate a split between highly welfare-enhancing inventions
and inventions that are disappointing from a welfare perspective. The
former would become more valuable and more attractive to firms deciding
on resource allocation; the latter would become less so. This is precisely the
arrangement that a welfarist policymaker should hope to generate.312
B. Longer-Term Declines in Welfare
A related possibility is that our proposal may be self-defeating.
Extending a drug's patent term gives rise to precisely the same tradeoffs that
are implicated by any sort of patent term. On the one hand, the potential for
an increased term can spur firms to invest resources in inventing the drug in
the first place. This is the dynamic efficiency of patents.3 13 But on the other
hand, increasing a patent's term will prevent generic drugs from entering
the marketplace for that much longer, keeping the price higher and
potentially reducing the number of people who have access to the drug. This
is the deadweight loss created by patents-the static inefficiency.314 The
concern is that extending a welfare-enhancing drug's patent term by five
years may lead to foregone welfare-through the individuals who cannot
312.

See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Commitments in Cost-Benefit Analysis,

103 VA. L. REV. 1809, 1812 (2017).
313.

See supra notes 31-35.

314.

See supra notes 36-48.
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afford it during those five years-that exceeds the increase in welfare from
the additional patent incentives. This type of concern is present whenever a
patent is granted or, in this case, extended.
This is ultimately an empirical question-just as it is for the patent
system as a whole-and thus we cannot dismiss it. But there are at least two
reasons for optimism. First, as we described in Part II, firm incentives for
drug development are severely skewed by the marketplace, and there is
ample evidence that firms are not prioritizing the types of drugs that will
lead to the greatest welfare gains. There are thus strong reasons to believe
that the effect of altering firm incentives-offering longer patent terms for
welfare-enhancing patents and weakening disappointing patents-will have
a significant effect. Our mechanism takes advantage of thick margins. Even
if the extended patent term means that some people are unable to afford the
drug for an additional five years, the value of these additional incentives
may swamp the static inefficiency.
The existing empirical evidence suggests that patent term alterations
such as the ones we propose could have significant effects on R&D
allocations. For example, Budish, Roin, and Williams studied firms'
decisions to invest in cancer treatments based on the length of clinical trials
for different sorts of treatments. 315 Potential treatments for late-stage cancer
take less time in clinical trials than do treatments for early-stage cancer,
because the outcome variable (survival) occurs more rapidly with late-stage
cancer. This means that the effective patent term for late-stage treatments is
longer than for early-stage treatments, and thus the size of patent incentive
is larger for late-stage treatments. 316 Consistent with expectations, the
authors find that fins invest significantly more resources in late-stage than
in early-stage cancer treatments, suggesting that they are responsive to
changes in effective patent duration.317 Thus, we anticipate meaningful
dynamic effects from enhanced R&D.
In addition, we expect that the static inefficiency from increasing a patent
term by five years will be relatively muted. The cost of prescription drugs
has recently become a significant political issue,3" 8 but it remains the case
that most Americans have health insurance plans that cover the cost of most
prescription drugs. Moreover, as we have explained, the mechanism we
propose will be self-regulating along this dimension as well. In order for a
315.
316.
317.
318.

Budish, Roin & Williams, supra note 27, at 5.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Poll: Nearly I in 4 Americans Taking PrescriptionDrugs Say It's Difficult to Afford Their

Medicines, Including Larger Shares Among Those with Health Issues, with Low Incomes and Nearing
Medicare Age, KFF (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press-release/poll-nearly-1-in-4-a
mericans-taking-prescription-drugs-say-its-difficult-to-afford-medicines-including-larger-shares-withow-incomes/ [https://perma.cc/9YWS-42J5].
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drug to increase welfare sufficiently to qualify for a term extension, it will
almost necessarily need to be accessible to a large number of people. In
order for it to be accessible to that many people, it will have to be priced
reasonably or covered by most insurance plans. If access during the first
eighteen years of the patent term is relatively widespread, there is no reason
to believe that it would narrow significantly during any patent term
extension. Therefore, while we are sensitive to the possibility that the longer
patent term will deny some people access to the drug, and while such a
possibility cannot be ruled out, we suspect that the effect will be smaller
than it would be for other types of inventions or for drugs that did not meet
the standard for an extension.
Of course, as we alluded to above, there is the residual possibility that a
firm will attempt to game the system by holding down the price through the
eighteenth year of the patent term in order to qualify for an extension and
then raising it once the extension has been granted. As we explained, we
would explicitly prohibit this pernicious practice as a condition of receiving
a patent term extension.
C. Welfare Measurement, Age, and Disability
Finally, we can imagine an objection to our proposed mechanism as
favoring younger people-and drugs that will cure diseases that afflict
them-over older people. Any calculation of human welfare that
incorporates duration as a component, be it WBUs or QALYSs, will tend to
place greater weight on a drug that saves (that is, prolongs) the life of a
younger person than a drug that saves (prolongs) the life of an older person.
The simple reason is that the younger person has more life yet to live, and
so a drug that prevents that person from dying of that disease will yield
greater increases in welfare. Allowing a ten-year-old to live an additional
seventy years is worth more, in welfare terms, than allowing a seventy-yearold to live an additional ten years.
This built-in preference may seem barbaric to some. It seems to fly in
the face of the deontological view that all lives have equal value. And
economists would undoubtedly point out that the elderly typically exhibit
greater willingness to pay for drugs and other medical treatments than the
young. 3 19 But we think this preference is a natural consequence of adopting
a welfarist approach, and we view it as a feature, not a bug, of this system."'
We should want firms to invest additional resources in drugs and treatments
319. See, e.g., Joseph E. Aldy & w. Kip Viscusi, Age Differences in the Value of StatisticalLife:
Revealed Preference Evidence, 1REV. ENV'T ECON. & POL'Y 241 (2007).
320. John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Welfare as Happiness, 98
GEO. L.J. 1583 (2010).
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that will save the young, who could have long, fruitful lives ahead of them.
Indeed, the fact that the elderly exhibit greater willingness to pay for drugs
is part of the economic problem that motivates our proposal. Their greater
willingness to pay is almost certainly driven by their greater ability to pay:
the elderly have amassed more wealth than the young (and their parents).
Welfare, not wealth, should be the motivating criterion of the patent system.
Separately, some people object to the use of QALYs in healthcare
decision-making, because, in certain circumstances, it could create biases
against people with disabilities. 321 One possible source of bias is that
QALYs, because they are largely based on the judgments of nondisabled
people, do a poor job of estimating HRQoL for people with disabilities. Yet
while this is potentially a problem for QALYs generally, it should not pose
a concern in the context of our proposal. First, consider drugs that improve
the quality of one's life. In calculating the welfare effect of this type of drug,
the individual's baseline is irrelevant. All that matters is how much the drug
improves one's quality of life above that baseline. If QALYs are
underestimating the baseline for people with disabilities, this should not
affect the calculation of the drug's contribution to welfare.3 22
A second, related objection to the use of QALYs and other attempts to
quantify health is more forceful, but it simply does not apply to our proposal.
Consider, for example, a policymaker or insurer who could only save the
lives of one hundred people, and who had to choose between saving the
lives of either one hundred nondisabled people or one hundred people with
disabilities who would (according to the argument) have shorter life
expectancies at lower HRQoL. If she tried solely to maximize net QALYs,
she might choose to save the lives of the nondisabled people, again because
of the fact that QALYs do a poor job of estimating the quality of life of
disabled people.32 3 This could be wrongful and discriminatory.
But pharmaceutical companies are very rarely faced with decisions such
as this one. They are rarely forced to decide whether to pursue research on
a drug that would save the lives of some number of people with disabilities
versus another drug that would save the lives of nondisabled people. Few
such drugs exist. Instead, they are deciding between drugs that treat
different conditions and that, in theory at least, improve the lives of

321.

For discussions of these issues, see Peter A. Ubel, Jeff Richardson & Jose-Luis Pinto Prades,

Life-Saving Treatments and Disabilities: Are All QALYs Created Equal?, 15 INT'L J. TECH.
ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 738 (1999); Govind Persad, ConsideringQuality of Life While Repudiating
DisabilityInjustice: A PathwaysApproach to Setting Priorities,47 J.L. MED. & ETHtCS 294 (2019).
322. In fact, if the drug improves some aspect of life that is related to the individual's disability,
QALY-based measures could actually overstate the value of the drug if they underestimate the baseline

quality of life of individuals with disabilities.
323.

Paul Menzel, How Should What Economists Call "Social Values" Be Measured?, 3 J. Ethics
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everyone being treated. If, under our proposal, drug companies are
increasingly motivated to search for research opportunities that will
generate the most net welfare, they will tend to pursue pharmaceuticals that
improve the lives of people whose ailments limit their survival or depress
their quality of life-including people with disabilities. Thus, to the extent
that people with disabilities start with lower baselines in terms of longevity
or HRQoL, we expect that drug companies will find it more efficient to
show significant therapeutic improvements by treating those communities
than they will by addressing issues of otherwise healthy communities.324
In any event, we agree that QALYs are flawed,1 2 ' and this is one of the
principal reasons that we favor adopting WBUs over QALYs to measure
patient welfare. 32 6 At the same time, we are confident that using QALYs to
estimate patient value is far superior to the current alternative: the United
States' deeply imperfect market for healthcare.327 All told, our proposal
would be an improvement upon the status quo for people with disabilities.
D. Measurement Challengesfor Vaccines and PersonalizedMedicine
Finally, we address possible complications that might arise from
attempts to assess the welfare benefits of vaccines and personalized
medicines. To this point, our paradigm case has concerned a standard drug
that comes in one form, provides benefits only to the person who takes the
drug, and improves the individual's health condition ex post. But not all
pharmaceutical innovations follow this form. Most obviously, vaccines are
administered ex ante-before an individual has contracted a disease-rather
than ex post. They are preventions, not treatments. In addition, vaccines
often create positive externalities or produce dynamic effects. 328 Each
person who is vaccinated against a disease helps reduce the spread of that
disease to other people, lowering their risk as well. 32 9 In theory, then,
measuring the welfare effects of a given individual dose of a vaccine could
be more complex than measuring the welfare effects of a standard drug
treatment. It might depend on how many other people in the relevant
324. People with disabilities generally have lower wealth than nondisabled people, so they may
also have diminished ability to pay for improved health technology that is not covered by their insurance.
See Buccafusco, supra note 80. Again, interventions that decouple research incentives from wealth and
that connect them to therapeutic value are likely to assist people with disabilities.
325. This is why we have argued elsewhere that net social welfare is not the only desideratum that
policymakers should care about. Bronsteen et al., supra note 320, at 1588-1600.
326. See discussion supra Part II.A.
327. See supranotes 156-157 and accompanying text.
328. Michael Kremer, Creating Markets for New Vaccines, Part I: Rationale (Nat'l Bureau of

Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7716, 2000).
329.

ERNST R. BERNDT, RENA N. DENONCOURT & ANJLI C. WARNER, U.S. MARKETS FOR
&

VACCINES: CHARACTERISTICS, CASE STUDIES, AND CONTROVERSIES 24-25 (2009); see also Xue

Oullette, supra note 95, at 22-23.
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population receive the vaccine, the risk factors of the vaccinated individual,
or any number of other factors.
This is not, however, an insurmountable hurdle. It is possible to estimate
the amount of well-being that is currently being lost from diseases that do
not have vaccines. 3 30 For example, five million people die each year from
tuberculosis, and many more are made very sick from the disease.33 ' If a
firm introduces a vaccine that reduces the incidence of the disease, it should
be credited for the reductions in mortality and morbidity not just of those
who receive the vaccine but also of those who benefit from "herd
immunity."332 Researchers have compiled estimates of the QALY benefits
that accrue from a number of vaccines, including for HIPV, 333 Lyme
disease,334 and rotavirus,335 among others.336 It will also be possible to
estimate the effects of vaccines for COVID-19 based on the number of lives
saved and suffering averted. 337 These numbers could be used for
determining the relative welfare benefits of patented vaccines. 338
Importantly, our proposal would help moderate the distortion that the
market for pharmaceuticals creates in favor of treatments over cures. As we
noted above, pharmaceutical companies may find selling regular treatments
to be more lucrative than selling cures, and they will tend to invest in the
330. Although some estimates will be better than others. See Isaac Chotiner, The Contrarian
Coronavirus Theory that Informed the Trump Administration, NEW YORKER (Mar. 30, 2020), https://ww
w.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-contrarian-coronavirus-theory-that-informed-the-trump-administr
ation [https://perma.cc/5S2F-QL4M].
331. Kremer, supra note 328, at 36.
332. M. Brisson & W. J. Edmunds, Economic Evaluation of Vaccination Programs: The Impact
of Herd-Immunity, 23 MED. DECISION MAKING 76, 76 (2003) ("Mass vaccination not only reduces the
incidence of disease in those immunized but also indirectly protects nonvaccinated susceptibles against
infection. The concept of indirect protection of susceptibles (e.g., nonvaccinees) is termed herdimmunity.") (emphasis omitted).
333. Sarah C. Woodhall, Mark Jit, Chun Cai, Tina Ramsey, Sadique Zia, Simon Crouch, Yvonne
Birks, Robert Newton, W. John Edmunds & Charles J. N. Lacey, Cost of Treatment and QALYs Lost
Due to Genital Warts: Data for the Economic Evaluation of HPV Vaccines in the United Kingdom, 36
SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 515 (2009).
334. Nancy A. Shadick, Matthew H. Liang, Charlotte B. Phillips, Karin Fossel & Karen M. Kuntz,
The Cost-Effectiveness of Vaccination Against Lyme Disease, 161 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 554

(2001).
335. Baudouin Standaert, Nathalie Parez, Bertrand Tehard, Xavier Colin & Bruno Detoumay,
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Vaccination Against Rotavirus with RIX4414 in France, 6 APPLIED
HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL'Y 199 (2008).
336. For one example, see Edward Miguel & Michael Kremer, Worms: Identifying Impacts on
Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities, 72 ECONOMETRICA 159 (2004)
(performing a welfare calculation on a type of preventative medicine).
337. Of course, earlier introduction of a vaccine for COVID-19 generates substantially more
benefit than just lives saved, because it speeds the rate at which society can return to normal and people
can return to work. While enormous, we do not anticipate estimating these welfare gains for use in our
patent analysis, largely because they will be supernumerary.
338. See Berndt et al., supra note 329, at 32-34; Paul Fine, Ken Eames & David L. Heymann,
"HerdImmunity ": A Rough Guide, 52 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 911, 915 (2011) (describing the
dynamics of herd immunity).
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former at the expense of the latter. 339 Under the current system, firms cannot
internalize the benefits of vaccines that extend to people who do not receive
the vaccine but who are helped through herd immunity or eradication. But
our proposal would allow patentees to include those benefits in their
estimates. The possibility of reaping monopoly prices over an extended
patent term could help reduce the market distortion favoring repeated-use
treatments.
Personalized medicine raises a different set of concerns. Personalized
medicine involves treatments that are specially designed and targeted to the
individual patient, often involving small variations of a common treatment
at the molecular level. 340 No two treatments (for two different individuals)
are identical. 34' This means that in some cases it may not be obvious where
one drug ends and another begins-or, put another way, which outcomes to
attribute to a single drug or a single patent. Personalized medicine can give
rise to tricky line-drawing problems where treatments are similar but not
identical and multiple patents overlap. 3 4 2
Certainly, it would be wrong to decrease incentives for the development
of personalized medicine merely because each separate treatment affects
fewer people than do traditional medicines. All else equal, we would rather
a pharmaceutical company develop one hundred medicines for one hundred
separate people, improving each one's life by five QALYs, than have it
develop one medicine to treat one hundred people, improving each one's
life by only three QALYs. 343 We believe, however, that these issues could
be resolved by the PTO. The connection between treatments and patentsand the question of which treatments should collectively fall under the
heading of which patents-are the types of issues that courts and the PTO
should be able to sort through. To be sure, there will be litigation over these
line-drawing questions. But that type of litigation is inevitable any time the
law attempts to create classifications or sort different types of conduct.
Despite the fact that patent law is not facially technology-specific, it is well
known by this point that the law applies differently to different types of

339. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
340. Margaret A. Hamburg & Francis S. Collins, The Path to PersonalizedMedicine, 363 NEW
ENGLAND J. MEDICINE 301, 302 (2010) (explaining and describing personalized medicine).
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342. See W. Nicholson Price 11, Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won't Hinder Whole
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inventions. 34 4 Our approach will be no less straightforward or easily applied
than what the courts have already been doing, and the potential benefit to
human welfare is, if anything, much greater.
CONCLUSION

Advances in medical, social, and behavioral sciences have given
policymakers the tools to craft a patent regime that calibrates legal
incentives with an innovation's effects on well-being. Failing to do so leads
to underinvestment in truly valuable drugs and overinvestment in less
socially valuable drugs. Given the enormous stakes for the US healthcare
market, immediate changes to patent law are vital. In this Article, we have
provided a framework for policymakers to adapt patent law to maximize
well-being. Our proposals will certainly be resisted by some stakeholders.
But we hope that they will draw widespread support as a means of lowering
pharmaceutical costs while maintaining cutting-edge innovation.
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